

## EXHIBITS OF CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

## CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION EXHIBIT No. 1

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

- a. Japanese Operation Orders, consisting of sheets 2 and 55, showing that on 7 November 1941 preparations for war against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands were planned for "Y Day 8 December", which would be 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor time.  
The following papers were obtained from the files of the Headquarters and of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, unless otherwise noted.
- b. Letter from Lt. Colonel Eugene J. Fitzgerald to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., dated 29 March 1941.
- c. Letter from Lt. General Walter C. Short to Admiral C. C. Bloch, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H., dated 29 May 1941.
- d. Papers relating to War Department radio No. 924, 8 July 1941, "Japanese War Policy".
- e. Papers relating to traffic on Burma Road. Inter-staff routing slip is initiated by General Short.
- f. Memorandum re "Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan" dated 1 August 1941.
- g. Memorandum from Brig. General Sherman Miles to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hqs. Hawaiian Department, forwarding copy of FBI report of Sir George Paisn.
- h. Letter from Lt. Colonel Kendall J. Fielder to War Department General Staff, MID, G-2, Washington, D. C., dated 6 September 1941.
- i. Photostated copy of reported talks of General Short and Admiral Kimmel in *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* dated 18 September 1941, obtained from Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd.
- j. G-2 estimate of International (Japanese) situation, dated 17 October 1941, initialed by General Short.
- k. Special intelligence report re New Japanese Premier, Hideki or Eiki Tojo, dated 17 October 1941.
- l. Japanese Policy for East Asia, translation of *Tairliku*, Japanese magazine, for May 1941.
- m. Inter-staff routing slip relating to War Department radio, 20 October 1941, re "Estimate of Japanese Situation".
- n. Wire dated 20 October 1941 relating to Japanese foreign policy.
- o. G-2 estimate of international (Japanese) situation, dated 25 October 1941, initialed by General Short.
- p. Letter from Brig. General Sherman Miles to Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2, Hqs. Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November 1941, forwarding memorandum containing information received from Orient.
- q. Cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila night of 3 December 1941, initialed on reverse side by Col. Bicknell.
- r. Report dated 31 August 1945 obtained from British showing source of certain information in Colonel Wilkinson's cable.
- s. Copies of cable messages forwarded to Captain Hastings from Commander (I. C.), Admiralty, SWI, on 16 July 1945, obtained from British.
- t. Copy of cable received from Colonel Wilkinson at Manila on 27 November 1941, initialed on reverse side by Col. Bicknell.
- u. Transcript of telephone conversation, 11 October 1941, obtained from Navy.
- v. Transcript of telephone conversation, 1 December 1941, obtained from Navy.

- w. Transcript of telephone conversation, 2 December 1941, obtained from Navy.
- x. Telephone intercepts obtained from FBI.
- y. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian Department, 27 November 1941.
- z. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 29 November 1941.
- aa. Cable from General Short to Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C., 27 November 1941.
- bb. Report from General Short to the Chief of the Army Air Forces, 4 December 1941.
- cc. Cable from General Marshall to C. G., Fort Shafter, Hawaiian Department, 7 December 1941.
- dd. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, 7 December 1941.
- ee. Cable from General Short to the Chief, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., 7 December 1941.
- ff. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 December 1941.
- gg. Inter-staff routing slip relating to War Department radio No. 541, 8 December 1941, "Ground Personnel needed & re impossible to dispatch fighter aircraft by Carrier".
- hh. Inter-staff routing slip relating to Radio 529.
- ii. Statement of Captain William B. Cobb, JAGD, 10 December 1941.
- jj. Cable from Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 December 1941.
- kk. Cable from General Short to Chief of Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., 8 December 1941.
- ll. Cable from "Colton Acting" to C. G. Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., 9 December 1941.
- mm. Cable from General Short to Signal Officer, Washington, D. C., 9 December 1941.
- nn. Cable from General Short to Major General H. H. Arnold, War Department, Washington, D. C., 9 December 1941.
- oo. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 11 December 1941.
- pp. Inter-staff routing slip relating to "Radio—Merle Smith."
- qq. Cable from Merle Smith to C. G., Honolulu, 11 December 1941.
- rr. Cable from General Short to The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., 11 December 1941.
- ss. Paper relating to "WD SEC Radio 529 7th re Ultimatum by Japanese and destruction of their code machine".
- tt. Reports by Colonel H. S. Burwell, AC, Special Inspector, Hqs. Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., to Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., dated 9 July 1941, and related papers.

SECRET

278/242/10/des/13/j

Affixed to 2/1:

*Caution on Handling*

1. This book will be handled by staff officers, the commanding officers concerned and higher officers.

2. For the benefit of persons directly responsible for communications, supply and related matters, these subjects have been treated.

3. As in the case of code books, care must be taken that the publication does not fall into enemy hands should the ship sink or be damaged.

5 Nov 41

Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet

Page 2/1: COMBINED FLEET ULTRASECRET OPERATION ORDER 1

Flagship NAGATO (\*1), SAEKI (\*2) WAN (TN Bay.)

5 Nov 41

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku (\*3)  
Commander in Chief,  
Combined Fleet

## COMBINED FLEET ORDER

*Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS* will be conducted in accordance with the Separate Volume.

SECRET

278/242/mab

Page 2/120-124:

Editor's Note: Document pages 2/120-124 inclusive comprise the errata indicated throughout the text in translator's notes. Document pages 2/125-150 duplicate 2/64-94 (G, Supply) and are omitted. Document page 2/151 (Appended Table 5, Organization of Supply Forces of Combined Fleet) follows 2/94.

## COMBINED FLEET ULTRASECRET OPERATION ORDER 2

Page 2/152:

Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI WAN 7 Nov 41

7 Nov 41  
YAMAMOTO, Osoroku  
Commander in Chief,  
Combined Fleet

145 of 600 copies

## COMBINED FLEET ORDER

First preparations for war  
Y Day 8 December

## COMBINED FLEET ULTRASECRET OPERATION ORDER 7

Page 2/154 2/155:

Flagship NAGATO, off HASHIRA SHIMA (\*1)

22 Dec 41  
YAMAMOTO, Osoroku  
Commander in Chief,  
Combined Fleet

## CONFIDENTIAL

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT SERVICE COMMAND,  
KAUAI DISTRICT,  
*Lihue, T. H., 29 March 1941.*

Subject: Japanese attitude on Kauai.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Enclosed is a copy of the English translation of a speech delivered by the Rev. Hiseki Miyasaki, Buddhist Priest of Lihue, Kauai during a send-off reception for selectees of the Lihue district on March 27, 1941.

2. The sentence inclosed in red brackets has been expurgated in press reports, since it was felt that reactionary Japanese groups would attack Mr. Miyasaki for such a statement.

3. The speech was given first in Japanese and then the English translation was read.

4. The words of Mr. Miyasaki express very well the attitude taken now by the majority of first and second generation Japanese on this Island.

5. It is becoming more and more apparent that as long as the local Japanese population is not antagonized by fools of other races, it will as a whole be loyal and peaceful.

6. The peace in the community and the loyalty of the Japanese are only endangered by persons like Mr. Cedric Baldwin, Manager of McBryde plantation—to mention only the worst offender—who delight in insulting the Japanese people without the slightest provocation.

1. Incl.: Copy of speech

EUGENE J. FITZGERALD,  
*Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry,*  
D. S. C.



10 JULY 1941.

G-2: ?. 2 Exec.

Assistant G-2: ?.

Subject: Japanese War Policy.

File: To be filed in #2 safe and noted in "Current Estimate" Japan—in Record Room.

CONFIDENTIAL

29 MAY 1941.

Admiral C. C. BLOCH, U. S. N.,  
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: In order that you may be acquainted with the steps taken by my command relative to the sabotage matter which you discussed with Colonel Throckmorton this morning I desire to inform you that during the holiday and week-end I have increased the guard over important installations, and have arranged for more detailed inspections of the guard during this period. Every attempt will be made not to bring this action into the limelight so that the community as a whole will not be aware of the increased surveillance.

I believe this will be sufficient to handle the situation as far as the Army is concerned.

With kindest personal regards,

Very sincerely yours,

WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

## INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B & LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements herein will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

AG 091/2

STATEMENT A.—*World tank-ship fleet, Dec. 31, 1945, versus Sept. 1, 1930*

No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: W. D. Radio #924, 8 July 41 "Japanese War Policy"	1939
1st Ind. AG 9 July 41...	C/S-----	1 Incl. File—Dept. Comdr. informed. Paraphrased copy furnished Dist. Intell. B. 14 N.D. Mura 10 July 41.	1939 R. H. D. 9 July 1941. A. G.

## SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.

WASHINGTON DC 152A July 8 1941

Secret

94 WAR BC 207 WD

CG Hawn Dept Fort Shafter TH:

Nine two four seventh AGMC for your information deduction from information from numerous sources is that Japanese Govt has determined upon its future



policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups Period. This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive action against maritime provinces of Russia if and when Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia Period Opinion is that Jap activity in the South will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out Period Neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated Period They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first August Period Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned.

ADAMS.  
334P/720P/8

Received as a secret communication.  
(Strike out two)  
Decoded by:

CAPT C J HARRISON SC  
818A JULY 9, 1941

#### HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

#### INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

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No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Traffic on Burma Road	
1st Ind. Contact Office, 7-18-41.	G-2-----	To note and return. Subject matter will be included in next foreign intelligence report.	By G. W. B.
2nd G-2, 7-18-41-----	CS-----	Please note. The increase in traffic and the high freight rates are of considerable interest.	Mum.
3rd Ind. C/S, 7-21-41----	G-2-----	Noted. Incls; n/c. Contact office-----	W. D. T. H. E.

PHILIP HAYES,  
Colonel, G. S. C., Chief of Staff.

1740 FORT STREET, VICTORIA, B. C.

DEAR MR. ANDREW: Herewith a few notes on the arrival of Burma Road trucks. The salt trucks arriving at Kunming originate in China a short distance down the Burma Road, but the figures for the trucks exclusive of salt represent imports from Burma & the steady increase in the average daily arrivals is interesting. Tonnage arriving at Chunking is negligible.

I also enclose a few figures on freight rates which I hope you will be able to follow.

Yours sincerely,

J. K. GORESFIELD.

## BUREAU ROAD TAXES

1) *Central Government Yunnan highways tax (payable each trip):*

N\$0.12 per ton/km. based on 960 kms. Wanting/Kunming i. e.:

1	ton truck outwards	N\$115.20	return	230.40
1½	" " "	172.80	"	345.60
2	" " "	230.40	"	460.80
2½	" " "	288.00	"	576.00
3	" " "	345.60	"	691.00

2) *Yunnan Provincial Government Highways tax:*

N\$0.10 per ton/km based on 975 kms. Wanting/Kunming

Up to 2 tons Outwards N\$195.00 return 390.00

2½ to 3 " " 292.50 " 585.00

3½ to 4 " " 390.00 " 780.00

(N. B. Fractions of a ton are regarded as 1 ton)

3) *C. M. Customs duty—5% ad valorem—plus 5% Consular fee*4) *Number plates and seasonal tax (quarterly):*

2 Plates N\$0.00 and N\$28.00 per quarter

5) *Yunnan consumption tax (payable once only):*

N\$802.50 per truck

1 &amp; 2 for Shippers account—if trucks overloaded weight of cargo is used as basis for calculating tax.

*Weight rates Lashio/Wanting/Kunming/Chungking*

	Distance	Rate	Approx. exchange	US \$ per ton
Lashio/Wanting	119 miles	\$39 per ton, \$2 fee to Truck Control	334	12.28
Wanting/Kunming	959 Km	NC\$2.92 per ton/Km	25	112.01
Kunming/Chungking	1150 Km	NC\$2.42 per ton/Km	25	111.32
Chungking/Kweiyang	488 Km	NC\$2.06 per ton/Km	25	40.21
Kwelyang/Kunming	662 Km	NC\$0.87 per ton/Km	25	23.04

Note: 1) Rate Wanting/Kunming recently increased from NC\$2.12 to NC\$2.92

2) Rate Kunming/Chungking recently increased from NC\$2.12 to NC\$2.42

3) Where no return cargo Kunming/Wanting Government rate for "empty despatch" allowance NC\$1.62 per ton/Km @ Exchange 25=US\$62.14 per ton.

4) Above rates include Highway Taxes shown on separate list.

5) No recent information regarding rates from Chungking available and rates vary with different types of cargo.

6) Rates shown from Lashio onwards are now paid for 1st class cargo e. g., gasoline.

HONG KONG, 19th June 1941.

*Burma Road*

Period	Truck arrivals at Kunming						Arrivals at Chungking		
	Including salt			Excluding salt		Total tons carried	No. of trucks		Total tons carried
	No. of trucks		Total tons carried	No. of trucks			Total	Average per day	
	Total	Average per day		Total	Average per day				
9/10/40-17/11/40	3360	112	9756	1740	58	5220	456	15	1368
8/11/40-17/12/40	3112	104	9529	1720	57	5677	464	15	1392
8/12/40-17/1/41	3815	123	11762	2448	79	7849	439	14	1317
8/1/41-17/2/41	4226	136	12343	2914	94	9100	459	15	1377
8/2/41-17/3/41	3958	141	12130	2855	102	8981	438	16	1314
8/3/41-17/4/41	5802	187	18189	4519	146	14195	505	16	1515
8/4/41-17/5/41	5858	195	18172	4794	100	15065	421	14	1263
8/5/41-12/6/41	5074	195	15604	4207	162	13071			
8/5/41-7/6/41							266	13	798
Total	35205	148	107985	25197	106	79158	3448	15	10344

## NUMBER OF TRUCKS PASSING FRONTIER AT WANTING

	To China	From China
December.....	4203	3619
January.....	5090	4629
February.....	5052	5009
March.....	6282	6207
April.....	6194	5658

Hongkong, 19th June, 1941.

ARMY CONTACT OFFICE,  
FEDERAL BUILDING,  
Honolulu, T. H., 1 August 1941.

Memorandum: Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan.

The Asama Maru arrived offport from Japan at 2:00 P. M., and docked at Pier #8 at 3:30 P. M., 31 July 1941. Ship sailed for San Francisco and Los Angeles at 9:00 A. M., 1 August 1941.

Based on observations of several passengers, the actions of the ship en route were as follows: From 22 July till arrival in port passengers were allowed to receive radiograms, but were not allowed to send them; they were also prevented by the Stewards from listening to the radios in the lounges. On the second 23 July (the day after crossing the date line) the ship turned about and headed west until the morning of the 24th July, when they turned north in the vicinity of the 180th meridian, proceeding far enough north that the ship was laying in cold fog banks; they hove to in this vicinity until the evening of the 26th July, during which time they painted the funnels black, and painted out the Japanese flags on the hull and deck. On the evening of 26th July the ship headed toward Honolulu; then, in mid-morning of 27 July a notice was posted stating that the ship had been ordered back to Yokohama, and the ship again headed west for about 36 hours. In the evening the passengers noted that the ship was again headed east and that the notice had been taken down, and from the 28th July on, the ship continued on into this port.

It is interesting to note that the ship began its actions before the action was taken freezing credits.

Reliable business men report that Japan is very short on carbon black; and that they have some stock of roller bearings on hand, but neither the materials nor facilities for producing them; and that any shortage of this item would seriously hamper their airplane production. They are collecting all scrap iron in cities, even including iron fences and ornamental irons on buildings. Other items reported to be short are high stable cotton; rubber supplies; high test aviation gasoline; sugar; flour; leather; wool; and anesthetics.

It is reported there are many Germans in all public offices in Japan, even including police departments, post offices, and finance offices; these men are said to wear civilian clothing, but with a large Nazi emblem in their coat lapel. Regulations are said to be mere translations from regulations used in Germany. On 3 July 1941 three German raiders put in at Yokohama, which were [sic]



201 (Paisn, George)

CI  
WAH

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,  
Washington, D. C., August 28, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Headquarters Hawaiian Department.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,  
SHERMAN MILES,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1 Enclosures:

201—Ltr to Pres. Roosevelt from one George Paisn re Japanese in Hawaii: dtd 8/3/41.

CONFIDENTIAL

MID 201 (Paisn, George)

Strictly private and  
confidential.

THE BOREAS,  
BLUE RIDGE,  
New York State.

Aug 3 1941.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I am really sorry to trouble you with another letter on your holiday cruise, but the matter may be of such immediate importance that I feel compelled to write without awaiting your return.

As I understand the main base of the American fleet in the Pacific is Hawaii and if this be so there must be large reserves of munitions of all kinds in that inland. I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of some kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live in Hawaii, the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source of this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can be trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of these reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and demand the most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval and of the military authorities in Hawaii. Could Japan destroy these stores and these reserves by sabotage, the American fleet would be at the mercy of the Japanese fleet and an almost desperate situation might arise. Further, it is of supreme moment that even the American soldiers and sailors detailed to guard these supplies should be chosen from the highly trustworthy. The blowup of these ammunition reserves including torpedoes would be worth to Japan any risk and any money. A doped or even a drunken American sentinel or guard might possibly be all that was necessary to enable the saboteur to effect his purpose. Then there is the question of money. Japan would doubtless be prepared to pay any sum to any person who would be willing to co-operate. It may be that my anxieties are excessive and that the American Army and Naval officials have taken every possible precaution against the Japanese living in Hawaii, the Hawaiians themselves or any fifth columnist in the American Army or Navy, but no possible precaution that can be taken to guard these munition reserves should be left untaken in view of the disastrous results that might come from failure to take the necessary precautions.

Hoping you will have a most enjoyable holiday and will come back with renewed health.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ GEORGE PAISN.

The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt.

8/21/41.

Copies to:

G-3

Haw.

VSR/lge

## CONFIDENTIAL

EHG/td

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS AREA,  
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,  
Governors Island, New York, November 28, 1941.

Subject: George Paish (Paisn).  
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,  
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,  
Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Referring to your communications dated September 30 and November 5, 1941, there is inclosed herewith copy of a report made to this office by the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding subject.

2. This is transmitted for your information and records.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

F. J. Pearson,  
F. J. PEARSON,  
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,  
Executive Officer, G-2.

1 Incl.—(dupl.)  
copy FBI rept.

## CONFIDENTIAL

## COPY OF FBI REPORT

An attempt was made on September 24, 1941 to contact Mr. PAISN at the address furnished by this office to the Newark office, at which time it was learned from his daughter-in-law, MRS. DONALD G. PAISH, that his true name is SIR GEORGE PAISH and that he could be interviewed at 52 Briarcliff Road, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey, as soon as the family had completed moving to that address. Subsequently, on October 4, 1941, SIR GEORGE PAISH was interviewed, at which time he furnished the following information:

SIR GEORGE went to Japan in the Spring of 1939 for a three weeks' lecture tour at the instance of the Yokohama Species Bank. During his three weeks' stay, he delivered about 15 lectures before business groups on subjects pertaining to world trade. The central theme of these lectures was the necessity for world trade to the happiness and prosperity of nations and the necessity for world peace to make trade possible. SIR GEORGE returned to England via Hawaii and the United States in the Spring of 1939. Upon his arrival at Honolulu, he was taken in tow by the Honolulu representative of the Yokohama Species Bank, whose name at this time he could not recall. He attributed great significance to the relations which he observed between the Species Bank representative and a group of people at a party given in his honor. At the party, the Hawaiian "Fire Goddess" danced and otherwise entertained the gathering.

SIR GEORGE was introduced to several ladies by the "FIRE GODDESS" and during the course of the evening he turned the trend of conversation to any spirit of nationalism that might exist among the Hawaiians. He was told that the Hawaiians are "a spirited people". He inferred from this that the possibility exists of a move towards independence on the part of Hawaiians if the United States should enter war with Japan and that the Hawaiians might all pray to a Japanese promise of "liberation".

SIR GEORGE also noticed that the United States' fortifications seemed to be inadequately guarded and he feared the possibility of the Japanese prevailing upon the childlike nature of some Hawaiians to influence them to carry in a bomb or otherwise sabotage the stores of the United States Army or Navy garrisons on the islands. SIR GEORGE stated that he had no particular individuals in mind but that at the time when he wrote the letter to the President it seemed to him that the crucial moment in Japanese-American relations had arrived and he felt it incumbent upon himself to utter his word of warning to America to be on guard and alert as to her outposts. He stated that he now considers this danger lessened due to the astute diplomacy of the United States State Department.

SIR GEORGE also furnished two copies of a reprint from "Le Canada" of Montreal, of a speech which he gave on July 22, 1941 entitled, "The World's Unlimited Emergency", and two copies of an advertising broad-side outlining his publications and ability as a lecturer.

It was noted that SIR GEORGE is a man of considerable age and a charming conversationalist. However, he seemed to be living somewhat in the past in that



he interspersed his account of the Hawaiian incident with frequent reference to pre-World War associations, characters and historical events.

I am furnishing the above for your confidential information.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF  
FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 30 September 1941.*

In reply refer to:

336.8—(Japanese).

Subject: Letter from George Paisn Relative to Japanese Activities in Hawaii.  
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Headquarters, 2nd Corps Area, Governors Island, New York.

1. The attached S/I is forwarded for your identification, with the request that Mr. George Paisn be contacted for the information he claims to possess concerning the existence of an understanding between Japanese in Hawaii, the Japanese Government, and the native Hawaiians.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,  
*Lt. Colonel, Inf.,  
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.*

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT

M. I. D.

INTELLIGENCE SECTION, CONTACT OFFICE,  
215 DILLINGHAM BUILDING,  
*Honolulu, T. H., 30 September 1941.*

Subject: Letter from George Paisn to The Honorable F. D. Roosevelt.  
Summary of Information:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I am really sorry to trouble you with another letter on your holiday cruise, but the matter may be of such immediate importance that I feel compelled to write without awaiting your return.

As I understand the main base of the American fleet in the Pacific is Hawaii and if this be so there must be large reserves of munitions of all kinds in that inland. I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of some kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live in Hawaii, the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source of this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can be trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of these reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and demand the most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval and of the military authorities in Hawaii. Could Japan destroy these stores and these reserves by sabotage, the American fleet would be at the mercy of the Japanese fleet and an almost desperate situation might arise. Further, it is of supreme moment that even the American soldiers and sailors detailed to guard these supplies should be chosen from the highly trustworthy. The blowup of these ammunition reserves including torpedoes would be worth to Japan any risk and any money. A doped or even a drunken American sentinel or guard might possibly be all that was necessary to enable the saboteur to effect his purpose. Then there is the question of money. Japan would doubtless be prepared to pay any sum to any person who would be willing to co-operate. It may be that my anxieties are excessive and that the American Army and Naval officials have taken every possible precaution against the Japanese living in Hawaii, the Hawaiians themselves or any fifth columnist in the American Army or Navy, but no possible precaution that can be taken to guard these munition reserves should be left untaken in view of the disastrous results that might come from failure to take the necessary precautions.

Hoping you will have a most enjoyable holiday and will come back with renewed health.

Very sincerely yours,  
The Honorable F. D. ROOSEVELT.

/s/ GEORGE PAISN.

✓ Evaluation  
-- of source -- of information  
X Undetermined X



## CONFIDENTIAL

WCG/cjo

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS AREA,  
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,  
Governors Island, New York, October 15, 1941.

Subject: Letter From George Paisn Relative to Japanese Activities in Hawaii.  
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Headquarters, Hawaiian Department Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

1. Reference is made to your communication of 30th, September, with above subject title.

2. Before this office can comply with request contained therein to interview the subject, it is requested that this office be supply with Mr. PAISN'S address, inasmuch as there is nothing contained in your communication which would indicate that he is a resident of this Corps Area.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

F. J. PEARSON,  
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,  
Executive Officer, G-2.

1st Ind.

336.8(ACO).

INTELLIGENCE SECTION, CONTACT OFFICER,  
214 DILLINGHAM BUILDING,  
Honolulu, T. H., 5 November 1941.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hdqrs. 2d Corps Area, Governors Island, N. Y.

1. Mr. Paisn's address as shown on his letter to the President was "The Boreas, Blue Ridge, New York State". This address was inadvertently omitted in S/I of 30 September 1941.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL,  
Lieut. Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2,  
Contact Officer.

## CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 6 September 1941.

In reply refer to:

350.05 (G-2).

Subject: Summaries of Information.

To: War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G-2, Washington, D. C.

1. It has been noted that many of the Summaries of Information received from your office originate with Office Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and have already been furnished this office by the Navy.

2. The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Department, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.

3. Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate and unless there are other reasons to the contrary it is recommended that such notices from your office be discontinued in order to avoid the duplication of effort.

Kendall J. Fielder,  
KENDALL J. FIELDER,  
Lieut. Colonel, Inf.,  
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

(Item I of Exhibit 1 being pages 28E and 29E is a photostatic copy of a portion of the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* dated 18 September 1941, relating to reported talks of General Short and Admiral Kimmel. This material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 7 and 8, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen Investigation.)

## CONFIDENTIAL

Issuing Office: G-2, H. H. D.  
Army Contact Office  
Honolulu, T.H.

Date: 17 October 1941.—1200

## G-2 ESTIMATE OF INTERNATIONAL (JAPANESE) SITUATION

1. *Summary of Situation*

a. With the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet, the 16th instant, tension in the Pacific reached a new high. The fall of said cabinet is apparently primarily due to a breakdown of the rapprochement negotiation between America and Japan, and also due to extreme pressure from the rightist elements in Japan as a result of German success against Russia, and also for fear of complete encirclement of Japan by the ABCD group.

8. The situation is generally admitted as being extremely critical, and is still necessarily uncertain, due to the fact that the formation of the new cabinet has not been completed and, consequently, little or no definite information is available as to the attitude of individual members, and nothing as to what the attitude of the cabinet as a whole will be.

c. Based upon contemporary opinions from various sources, however, it is fairly certain that Japan's basic policy, as heretofore frequently stated, will remain unchanged; and it is expected that Japan will shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation or combination of nations which might oppose the execution of said policies—irrespective of what means she may choose to adopt or course she may decide to take in their achievement.

2. *Conclusions*

According to present indications, it is highly probable that Japan will, in the near future, take military action in new areas of the Far East. The primary reasons for such a move or moves are believed to be as follows:

d. *Capabilities*

1. Desperate economic conditions internally—making it perhaps preferable to risk a major foreign war rather than internal revolution.

2. Violent opposition by the "rightist" elements who are opposed to any appeasement of the democracies and desire more active cooperation with the Axis—for the time being.

3. That major successes of the Axis in Europe and the potential collapse of Russian resistance, afford an unparalleled opportunity for expansion with chances of minimum resistance—that is, when the strength of the Axis is at it maximum, and the strength of the democracies not yet fully mobilized.

4. A desire to break the so-called encirclement of the ABCD block.

b. *Probable Moves.*—The most likely moves which Japan may make in the near future, and the sequence thereof, are as follows:

1. Attack Russia from the east.

2. Pressure French Indo-China and Thailand for concessions in the way of military, naval, and air bases, and guarantees of economic cooperation.

3. Attack British possessions in the Far East.

4. Defend against an American attack in support of the British.

5. Attack simultaneously the ABCD block at whichever points might promise her greatest tactical, strategic, and economic advantages.

c. *Reasons Justifying These Moves.*—The basis for each of the above possible moves are considered to be as follows:

1. *Attack on Russia.*—(a) Japan's desire to extend her first line of defense as far to the west as possible as a primary defense against potential aerial attacks on the heart of Japan proper by a continental power.

(b) To set up a buffer state between herself and Germany (assuming that Germany will eventually attempt to extend her influence and control eastward to the Pacific).

(c) To secure immense quantities of much-needed raw materials known to be in Siberia.

(d) To secure effective control over, or perhaps stamp out, communism in the Far East by striking at the root or source of the doctrine.



(e) A possibility that an attack on Russia at this time can be undertaken with a reasonable chance of non-military intervention by the United States; and that even the British might not resort to active military action in support of Russia in the Pacific, due to the fact that both the Americans and British are preoccupied in Europe, and that neither power has any genuine desire to ever see the state of the USSR emerge sufficiently strong to again plague the democratic states with the sinister ideals of communism.

(f) To open communications with Germany for the purpose of closer coordination and supply, in case it becomes necessary to continue the war against other Pacific powers.

(g) To achieve a spectacular victory which is now greatly needed to revive the morale of the people and prepare them for future efforts toward the south.

2. *Pressure French Indo-China and Thailand.*—Pressure on French Indo-China and Thailand for concessions of military, naval, or air bases, and guarantees of economic cooperation, is entirely to be expected, and this may either precede or follow, or occur simultaneously with an attack on Russia, in order to insure security in the south while her primary objective in the north is being achieved; and to afford her more and better strategic bases from which she can operate against Chungking's lines of communication, and/or American and British lines of communications in case it becomes necessary to defend herself against either or both of these powers. Also, to secure additional raw materials, food, etc.

3. *Attack on British Possessions in the Far East.*—Following the principle of defeating one opponent at a time—famous with her Axis partner, Hitler—it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain British military resistance to her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British; and do so without a simultaneous attack on American possession, because of no known binding agreement between the British and Americans for joint military action against Japan, and that the American public is not yet fully prepared to support such action. However, it must be evident to the Japanese that in case of such an attack on the British, they would most certainly have to fight the United States within a relatively short time.

4. *Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers.*—While a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle mentioned above, it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval program is completed.

An attack on the United States could not be undertaken without almost certain involvement of the entire ABCD block, hence there remains the possibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever points might gain for her the most strategic, tactical, or economical advantages over her opponents.

### 3. In Conclusion

Barring unforeseen and untoward incidents, which might set off a conflict in any quarter and invite measures and countermeasures never contemplated, it is believed that the above represents the most logical major moves that Japan may take and the probable sequence thereof. This is assuming that the new cabinet will be, as generally predicted, "strongly military" and will support the present demands of the "rightists" elements which were largely responsible for the fall of the Third Konoye cabinet.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL,  
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2,  
Contact Officer.

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## CONFIDENTIAL

Issuing Office: G-2, H. H. D.  
Army Contact Office  
Honolulu, T. H.

Date: 17 October 1941.

## SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Subjects: New Japanese Premier  
Hideki or Eiki Tojo

Lieutenant General; Director General of Military Aviation. Born December 1884, Tokyo. Graduate Military Staff College 1915; Attache Germany, 1919; instructor Military Staff College, 1922; Chief of Mobilization Section; Commander Infantry 1st Regiment; Sectional Chief General Staff Officer; Commander 24th Infantry Brigade, 1934-35; Commander Gendarmerie Headquarters and Chief Police Affairs Department of Kwantung Army, 1937; War Vice-Minister, May 1938-December 1938; Minister of War since December 1938.

Tojo stressed the exaltation of the cardinal principles of the so-called war-time cabinet for both the army and navy on 18 July 1941.

An interesting analysis of the new Japanese cabinet (Konoye) was made by Miss Kasuko Higuchi of Hilo, a keen student of Japanese government affairs who returned recently from Japan. According to her, "The War Minister is a conservative among the members of the army clique".

Commenting on the appointment of Tojo as premier, a local news article stated that he is a conservative.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL,  
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Asst. A. C. of S., G-2,  
Contact Officer.

*Distribution*

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## JAPANESE POLICY FOR EAST ASIA

An enlightening statement of Japanese policy is contained in an article entitled "The present stage of our great continental policy," written by Takehiko Okuhira, an instructor in Keijo Imperial University and published in Tairiku ("Great Continent") Magazine for May, 1941. A summary of the English translation of this article is as follows:

1. The great continental policy of Japan originated with the Korean problem of 1868. It has been consistent from beginning to end and has been guided by a spirit of universal concord. But it is based on the defensive point of view of wiping out any menace from the outside to our national defense.

The continental debouchment of Japan's economic power was first started in Korea. Then it was extended into China. But it was after the Russo-German war that it made its great progress and came to hold an important position in our great continental policy. It has taken a natural course, differing essentially from the aggressions of the Western European countries.

It was necessary for Japan to conclude an alliance with Germany and Italy, countries which are facing similar critical situations, due to the political upheaval in the world, and both of whom possess a common world view.

Our great continental policy in the present stage is also our world policy, and is based on the world view harbored by us. For not only does it aim at the expansion and development of our national power, but also signifies our proposal for a world administration.

2. Japan's policy aims at the creation of a new world order and the establishment of a greater East Asia mutual prosperity sphere. It has entered a new stage through the conclusion of the tripartite alliance. These three nations, which occupied opposite seats at the Paris Peace conference, have come to harbor the

same historical mission, the same economic circumstances, and the same political aim. They have banded together against the serious opposition of the nations advocating the maintenance of the *status quo*. The creation of new orders in Europe and Asia are not only their war aims, but also the guiding principle of the creation of a new world.

The principle acting as the support for the creation of a new world order has been provided by the words, "to regard the acquisition of appropriate territories by each of the nations as the *sine qua non* (necessity) for lasting peace." This principle is the correct basis for world partition, rather than the recognition of possession as legal from the fact that a nation got there first. The principle advocates the acquisition of appropriate territories by every nation of the world to enable it to exist on earth and not be shut off from space. It sets forth an idea of systematized order in place of the anarchical world order and world partition of today.

Another fundamental support for the creation of a new world order is the mutual recognition of the right of leadership for nations. Leadership as an ideology of order has definitely taken the place of the old idea of balance of power. In Europe, Germany and Italy are carrying on a war to wipe away the influence of Great Britain and put an end to her traditional policy of balance of power. Japan, who is the stabilizing power in East Asia, is showing a resolute determination and power to wipe away America's interference in the changing of the political situation. Their aims are the same.

3. The great continental policy and the Pacific policy are inseparable. It was hoped that America would understand this; but America gradually took over the receding British interests, and after the conclusion of the Tripartite alliance, America denounced the Axis as aggressors and strengthened her aid to Britain. She has been rushing headlong toward war. An agreement has been concluded between Great Britain and America for America to oppose Japan's navy, with quotations from Prof. Fieldhouse of Canada and Prof. Whitney Griswold to prove it. This has brought Japan's sea supremacy to the front. Japan's great continental policy aims to wipe away the intervention of third powers aiming to encircle Japan, dominate the China Seas, and also to terminate the clashes between the races of East Asia and their conquest by Europeans.

4. The Sino-Japanese treaty of Oct. 30, 1940, concluded at Nanking, for the readjustment of relations, failed to bring about complete peace despite the efforts of Wang Ching-Wei. But, as the manifestation of the pro-Japanese centralized government's collaboration toward the establishment of a new order in China, it unfolded a new phase in East Asia. The treaty does not discriminate between the winner and the loser and is based upon equality between Japan and China. It has furthered the formation of the East Asia bloc and strengthened the axis connecting Japan, Manchukuo and China, expanding their defense industries, building up their economy by acquiring and developing natural resources, and formed a union between Japan and China just short of military alliance. During the past half year the Chinese government has made progress by solving her financial problems, monetary system, peace and order problem, cultural problem (establishment of Nanking Central University), and is making great strides toward the resurrection of a new China. There are many obstacles in the path of the Chinese government: to overcome the feeling of dependence upon Britain and America. But the penetration of the great Asiatic principle, proclaimed by Wang Ching-Wei, and the withdrawal of British and American influences, which actually can be seen, will make the people of China realize that they are the descendants of a great and free people.

Chungking has been continuing her resistance, hoping for America's support. But President Roosevelt's special envoy, Carey, must have detected that conditions in Chungking are very different from propaganda sent to America. Her economic power is exhausted, transportation routes are deficient, is in conflict with Chinese Red Army, and estranged from her emigrants abroad. She is being made to dance to the tune of the dying embers of the mistaken nationalism of the intellectual class and America's political expediency of regarding her as a stone of the anti-Japanese cordon.

5. In August of last autumn, the landing of our troops in French Indo-China wrote a new page in the annals of the history of Asia. Loss of French influence led to demands by Thailand for the return of Laos and Cambodia territory. Behind the scene of Thailand and French Indo-China were Britain and America, with threats and warnings, siding with French Indo-China. Their attempts at reconciliation were rejected and America stopped the shipment of airplanes ordered by Thailand. A friendly neutrality agreement was signed between Japan and



Thailand, since which relations have drawn closer, with the opening up of an airway, trade agreements, and use of Japanese technicians. Our country, which is determined to maintain the peace and tranquility of the greater East Asia sphere at all cost, proposed to arbitrate and mediate the clash between Thailand and French Indo-China, and when this was accepted, held the peace conference at Tokyo. After about a month, this resulted in the acceptance of an impartial peace on March 11. This had profound significance, strengthening the tie among the three nations and making Japan's position of leadership in greater East Asia firmer and unshakable. Moreover, it enhanced the racial consciousness of the oppressed races of Southern Asia and installed in them hope. Thailand was able to push aside Britain's influence. Thailand is the spear to stab at Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, which are embraced within Japan's greater East Asia policy, and to the north of Thailand lies Burma, which is the gateway of India, while to the east lies Indo-China, which is an undeveloped treasurehouse and embraces Camranh Bay. All of the races of southern Asia have been robbed of their real eyes by the propaganda of Britain and America. But since they commonly entertain a righteous indignation against the conquerors and oppressors, it is expected that a time will come when they eventually will revolt.

6. The conclusion of the Sino-Japanese agreement and mediation of the Thailand-French Indo-China border clash, which occurred during the past half year, after the conclusion of the tripartite agreement, have made a great stride toward the creation of a new world order. Our relations with the Dutch East Indies are still being negotiated. Our country has decided to break with the status quo of Britain and America and fight resolutely against their antagonistic interference. The most urgent matter for us is to pay strictest attention to changing phases of the International situation and not take our eyes away from the political, economic, and military attacks against the Axis nations. America's anti-Japanese policy is of an unprecedented positive nature, and is changing from economic oppression to military coercion. Our continental policy should be made the core of our national defense. So long as the execution of our peaceful southward expansion is not threatened, our country will leave their military bases (such as Singapore) alone. More important than anything else is making the western Pacific and the South China sea "our waters", impregnable to the enemies. We should be aware of the fact that not only does the supremacy of the seas depend upon the actual strength of our fleet, but upon the number of naval bases and their position, our merchant fleet, our production power, and our strategic raw materials. Since that which would likely happen in the event of an emergency is protracted blockade warfare, it is an urgent matter to include the south in the generalized economy plan of Japan, Manchukuo, and China. The first work should be to awaken within the races of East Asia, who are suffering from the exploitation and oppression of the American and Englishman, their racial consciousness as Asiatics and encourage them to combine and unite.

The consummation of the Sino-Japanese treaty is to Wang Ching-wei like the discovery of a lighthouse. He is advancing along these brilliant rays toward lasting peace. But there are several hundred million people of Asia still wandering about in darkness. But their eyes are fixed on our moves to bring about the creation of a new order in East Asia, even through the smoke screen spread by the Englishman and the American. If a light to which they can really turn is not hung out today, our mission of resurrection of East Asia will become exceedingly difficult. Foreign Minister Komura's diplomatic plan embraced the resurrection of the races of East Asia. I think the arousing into action of a leader burning with the spirit of an adventurer from the races under bonds is not far away, and I cannot help but look forward to the glorious day of welcoming him.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff, including the Department C/A, the B & LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

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exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: WD Radio, 20 October 1941, "Estimate of Japanese Situation".	
1st Ind. AG 20 Oct 41.....	C/S.....	1 Incl.....	R. H. D.
3rd Ind. G-2 21 Oct. 41.....	AG.....	Noted. 1 Incl. N/C.....	K. J. F.

## SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.

Secret

8 WVY BC 47 WD WASHIN DC 1234P OCT 20 1941

20th Following War Dept estimate of Japanese situation for your information stop tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no repeat no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent

ADAMS.

1937A

Received as a secret communication.

Decoded by: LT G E HAVEN 1150A OCT 20 1941

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 20th."

To: Contact office noted by General Short & Col Phillips, new Acting C of S.

C/S HHD

CONFIDENTIAL

Issuing Office: G-2, H. H. D.

Army Contact Office,

Honolulu, T. H.

Time and date: 1200 25 Oct. 1941.

## G-2 ESTIMATE OF INTERNATIONAL (JAPANESE) SITUATION

1. *Summary of Situation.* Reference paragraph 1, G-2 Estimate of the International (JAPANESE) Situation, 1200 Oct. 17, 1941, there have been no fundamental changes in the international situation, centering on Japan, since the time mentioned; and the estimate is still in almost complete accord with contemporary opinions of most high officials and reputable observers who are known to be in close touch with the various phases of the present fast moving situation. However, the following generally summary is considered appropriate at this time:

a. A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. The fall of said cabinet was allegedly precipitated by unsatisfactory progress of the rapprochement negotiations between America and Japan, and by extreme pressure from "rightist" elements who have been clamoring for stronger ties with the Axis and more forceful opposition to the ABCD block, including Russia.

b. An apparently imminent collapse of the Russian forces in the west, together with the loudly proclaimed German successes everywhere, tended to accentuate the cry for action on the side of the Axis to such a degree that the Konoye cabinet could no longer resist, hence resigned en bloc, and was almost immediately replaced by a new cabinet headed by ex-War Minister, General Tojo.

c. Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—which automatically underscores Japan's policies with "intensified aggression"; definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States and other democracies; makes all protestations of peaceful intentions a sham or objective of suspicion; and forces America into a state of constant vigilance—but at least clarifies the situation to such an extent that we do know where we stand, what to expect, and what should be done.

2. *Conclusions.* No change in paragraph 2 of G-2 Estimate of 17 Oct. 1941.

However, several important incidents have transpired, or are scheduled to take place, which are certain to have a profound bearing on the probable course of events in question in the near future. These are:

a. The formation of a new Japanese "War Cabinet", headed by ex-War Minister, General Tojo.

b. The decision of Premier to continue his predecessor's order to permit three Japanese vessels to visit American ports for the purpose of transporting stranded Americans and Japanese nationals to their respective homelands.

c. Premier Tojo's expressed desire to continue rapprochement negotiations with the United States.

d. The order by the navy department to American vessels to avoid Asiatic ports in the north Pacific, including Shanghai.

e. The announced decision of the American government to abandon Vladivostok as a part of entry for war supplies to Russia, and to adopt the port of Archangel as the sole point of entry for such shipments.

f. Announcement of Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for consultation with the new cabinet.

3. *Justifications for conclusions.* The following is a brief analysis and evaluation of the above, based on limited reports, and is not to be regarded as conclusive, but rather to assist in making accurate conclusions on the general situation as subsequent events and special situations are presented:

a. *New Cabinet.* Paragraph 1 c above is the general answer. The only other noteworthy viewpoint received, and considered to be worth mentioning, is that General Tojo was selected to head the new cabinet because he was the *only* man considered capable of controlling the "extremist" army elements, and thus stave off any precipitate action until such time as the situation in Europe has become definitely clear, and until at least a decisive stage has been reached in rapprochement negotiations with the United States.

b. *Japanese vessels to America.* The Japanese government's decision to permit three ships to visit America for the purpose of repatriating stranded nationals of both countries, may be regarded either as a peaceful gesture or as a measure to "clear the decks" in the Pacific with a view to future naval and military moves. It will be recalled that the Japanese were careful to remove Japanese nationals from the interior of south China before spreading military operations to that section. It is considered impracticable to remove *all* Japanese nationals from America and American territories.

c. *Rapprochement Negotiations.* Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet has openly declared its intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—definitely our enemy—we can only expect Japan to make a similar use of peace negotiations as her partner, Hitler, i. e., as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies. From a military point of view such peaceful overtures should be preceded by concrete evidence of sincerity before they can be seriously considered.

d. *Navy Order to Clear American Ships from North Pacific.* This action on the part of the navy seems to have been largely "precautionary", which also appears fully justified—realizing that we are now definitely dealing with an exponent and ally of Hitler.

e. *Abandonment of Vladivostok as a Port of Entry for Russian Supplies.* Two issues are here involved:

(1) *Military.* The crucial point as to whether we will be able to continue to face Hitler across the English channel, across the Atlantic, or on American shores, centers in the British Isles. Convoys must cross the Atlantic in order to hold the British Isles *at all cost*, irrespective of what happens in the Pacific. Convoys to Archangel, for the greater part of the distance, could be carried on incidental to convoys going to the British Isles. Requirements of armed escorts for the remaining distance to Archangel, would probably be less than what



would be required over any Pacific route. In fact, with a hostile Japanese fleet in the Pacific, any practicable route across the Pacific to Russia may have been entirely ruled out. Assuming this to be the case, the most logical step would be not to undertake a thing that would certainly have to be abandoned later.

(2) *Diplomatic.* Inasmuch as the shipping of supplies to Russia via Vladivostok has been one of the major issues between America and Japan recently, the abandonment of said route may serve to keep the door of diplomacy open for a longer period; and, in case of an unforeseen major reverse for the Axis in Europe, might provide an open door for successful negotiations at a time when Japan desired to change her mind, seeing that further ties with the Axis were useless, and that a compromise with the democracies has become inevitable.

#### Confidential

f. *Nomura's report to New Cabinet.* This is considered a very normal procedure with the Japanese government. Mr. Nomura will be expected to give a review of his efforts in Washington and perhaps the last word on the American attitude. If his previous work is still in harmony with Japan's new policy, he may return to Washington. If not, it seems a fair assumption that he may not even be replaced. In case the abnormal procedure is followed, of dispatching a subordinate to Tokyo, it may be taken as an attempt to conceal the real gravity of the situation. This is not, however, a prediction.

*Remarks.* Everyone is interested in the answer to the question, When will Japan move?—a question which no one dares predict with certainty. However, the following points are considered to be worthy of mentioning:

a. Things which tend to indicate that a major move will not take place for approximately another month are: .

(1) The dispatch of Japanese vessels to the United States for return of stranded nationals of both countries to their respective homelands.

(2) Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for purpose of reporting to the new cabinet.

(3) Repeated declarations by Japanese officials that Japan desires to continue rapprochement negotiations.

(4) Extreme cold over Eastern Siberia makes military operations against Russia very risky before spring.

(5) A protracted Russo-German war seems much more likely now than it did immediately prior to the assumption of office by the new cabinet, and that the "rightists" who were crying for action against a "collapsing" Russia, may again hesitate to take the final plunge on the side of Hitler. If the intense cold plus a tired Russian army is able to stop the invincible legions of Hitler before Moscow (?), wisdom may dictate not to risk the matchless legions of Nippon against a rested Russian army under temperatures still lower than around Moscow.

(6) Announcement that Cabinet leaders have requested Emperor Hirohito to convoke a special five-day session of the Imperial Diet, beginning Nov. 15, at which time, it is predicted, the government will be asked to clarify its stand on international policies, particularly with reference to former Premier Konoye's message to President Roosevelt and the progress of the Washington negotiations.

b. In other words, it seems logical to believe that no major move will be made before the latter part of November—in any direction—with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring.

George W. Bicknell,

GEORGE W. BICKNELL,

*Lt. Col., G. S. C.,*

*Asst. A. C. of S., G-2,*

*Contact Officer.*

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Capt. Bryan, Trans. Sect.



27 Oct. 1941.

Subject G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation  
 G-2 IJL  
 Assistant G-2  
 C/I DBL  
 Public Relations HGU  
 Contact Officer Bofile  
 File C/S & G-3 Dept. direct.  
 Remarks Nothing re Hawaii.

G-2, HHD

CONFIDENTIAL

Issuing Office: G-2, H. H. D.,  
 Army Contact Office,  
 Honolulu, T. H.  
 Time and date: 1200 25 Oct. 1941.

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a. A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. The fall of said cabinet was allegedly precipitated by unsatisfactory progress of the rapprochement negotiations between America and Japan, and by extreme pressure from "rightist" elements who have been clamoring for stronger ties with the Axis and more forceful opposition to the ABCD block, including Russia.

b. An apparently imminent collapse of the Russian forces in the west, together with the loudly proclaimed German successes everywhere, tended to accentuate the cry for action on the side of the Axis to such a degree that the Konoye cabinet could no longer resist, hence resigned en bloc, and was almost immediately replaced by a new cabinet headed by ex-War Minister, General Tojo.

c. Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—which automatically underscores Japan's policies with "intensified aggression"; definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States and other democracies; makes all protestations of peaceful intentions a sham or objective of suspicion; and forces America into a state of constant vigilance—but at least clarifies the situation to such an extent that we do know where we stand, what to expect, and what should be done.

2. *Conclusions.* No change in paragraph 2 of G-2 Estimate of 17 Oct. 1941. However, several important incidents have transpired, or are scheduled to take place, which are certain to have a profound bearing on the probable course of events in question in the near future. These are:

a. The formation of a new Japanese "War Cabinet", headed by ex-War Minister, General Tojo.

b. The decision of Premier Tojo to continue his predecessor's order to permit three Japanese vessels to visit American ports for the purpose of transporting stranded Americans and Japanese nationals to their respective homelands.

c. Premier Tojo's expressed desire to continue rapprochement negotiations with the United States.

d. The order by the navy department to American vessels to avoid Asiatic ports in the north Pacific, including Shanghai.

e. The announced decision of the American government to abandon Vladivostok as a port of entry for war supplies to Russia, and to adopt the port of Archangel as the sole point of entry for such shipments.

f. Announcement of Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for consultation with the new cabinet.

3. *Justifications for conclusions.* The following is a brief analysis and evaluation of the above, based on limited reports, and is not to be regarded as con-

clusive, but rather to assist in making accurate conclusion on the general situation as subsequent events and special situations are presented:

a. *New Cabinet.* Paragraph 1 c above is the general answer. The only other noteworthy viewpoint received, and considered to be worth mentioning, is that General Tojo was selected to head the new cabinet because he was the *only* man considered capable of controlling the "extremist" army elements, and thus stave off any precipitate action until such time as the situation in Europe has become definitely clear, and until at least a decisive stage has been reached in rapprochement negotiations with the United States.

b. *Japanese vessels to America.* The Japanese government's decision to permit three ships to visit America for the purpose of repatriating stranded nationals of both countries, may be regarded either as a peaceful gesture or as a measure to "clear the decks" in the Pacific with a view to future naval and military moves. It will be recalled that the Japanese were careful to remove Japanese nationals from the interior of south China before spreading military operations to that section. It is considered impracticable to remove *all* Japanese nationals from America and American territories.

c. *Rapprochement Negotiations.* Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet has openly declared its intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—definitely our enemy—we can only expect Japan to make a similar use of peace negotiations as her partner, Hitler, i. e., as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies. From a military point of view such peaceful overtures should be preceded by concrete evidence of sincerity before the can be seriously considered.

d. *Navy Order to Clear American Ships from North Pacific.* This action on the part of the navy seems to have been largely "precautionary", which also appears fully justified—realizing that we are now definitely dealing with an exponent and ally of Hitler.

e. *Abandonment of Vladivostok as a Port of Entry for Russian Supplies.* Two issues are here involved:

(1) *Military.* The crucial point as to whether we will be able to continue to face Hitler across the English Channel, across the Atlantic, or on American shores, centers in the British Isles. Convoys must cross the Atlantic in order to hold the British Isles *at all cost*, irrespective of what happens in the Pacific. Convoys to Archangel, for the greater part of the distance, could be carried on incidental to convoys going to the British Isles. Requirements of armed escorts for the remaining distance to Archangel, would probably be less than what would be required over any Pacific route. In fact, with a hostile Japanese fleet in the Pacific, any practicable route across the Pacific to Russia may have been entirely ruled out. Assuming this to be the case, the most logical step would be not to undertake a thing that would certainly have to be abandoned later.

(2) *Diplomatic.* Inasmuch as the shipping of supplies to Russia via Vladivostok has been one of the major issues between American and Japan recently, the abandonment of said route may serve to keep the door of diplomacy open for a longer period; and, in case of an unforeseen major reverse for the Axis in Europe, might provide an open door for successful negotiations at a time when Japan desired to change her mind, seeing that further ties with the Axis are useless, and that a compromise with the democracies has become inevitable.

f. *Nomura's report to New Cabinet.* This is considered a very normal procedure with the Japanese government. Mr. Nomura will be expected to give a review of his efforts in Washington and perhaps the last word in the American attitude. If his previous work is still in harmony with Japan's new policy, he may return to Washington. If not, it seems a fair assumption that he may not even be replaced. In case the abnormal procedure is followed, of dispatching a subordinate to Tokyo, it may be taken as an attempt to conceal the real gravity of the situation. This is not, however, a prediction.

*Remarks.* Everyone is interested in the answer to the question, When will Japan move?—a question which no one dares predict with certainty. However, the following points are considered to be worthy of mentioning:

a. Things which tend to indicate that a major move will not take place for approximately another month are:

(1) The dispatch of Japanese vessels to the United States for return of stranded nationals of both countries to their respective homelands.

(2) Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for purpose of reporting to the new cabinet.

(3) Repeated declarations by Japanese officials that Japan desires to continue rapprochement negotiations.



(4) Extreme cold over Eastern Siberia makes military operations against Russia very risky before spring.

(5) A protracted Russo-German war seems much more likely now than it did immediately prior to the assumption of office by the new cabinet, and that the "rightists" who were crying for action against a "collapsing" Russia, may again hesitate to take the final plunge on the side of Hitler. If the intense cold plus a tired Russian army is able to stop the invincible legions of Hitler before Moscow (?), wisdom may dictate not to risk the matchless legions of Nippon against a rested Russian army under temperatures still lower than around Moscow.

(6) Announcement that Cabinet leaders have requested Emperor Hirohito to convoke a special five-day session of the Imperial Diet, beginning Nov. 15, at which time, it is predicted, the government will be asked to clarify its stand on international policies, particularly with reference to former Premier Konoye's message to President Roosevelt and the progress of the Washington negotiations.

b. In other words, it seems logical to believe that no major move will be made before the latter part of November—in any direction—with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring.

Distribution:

C/S H. H. D.  
G-2 H. H. D.  
G-3 H. H. D.  
G-2 Schofield Barracks  
G-2 24th Div.  
G-2 25th Div.  
F. B. I. (2)  
O. N. I. (2)  
Capt. Bryan, Trans. Sect.

George W. Bicknell  
GEORGE W. BICKNELL,  
LT. COL., G. S. C.,  
ASST. A. C. OF S., G-2,  
Contact Officer.

MID 336. (11-3-41) Haw. Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,  
Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Headquarters, Hawaiian Department

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,  
SHERMAN MILES,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1 Enclosures:

336. 1903-41)—MID Summ. of info. re Information received from the Orient: dtd. FMH

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT  
M. I. D.

NOVEMBER 3, 1941.

Subject: Information Received from the Orient.

Summary of Information:

The following information received from the Orient, dated August 26, 1941, is considered reliable:

1. Mr. HIROTA, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon Society, told of an order issued by War Minister TOJO (now Premier) "to complete full preparation to meet any emergency with United States in the Pacific.

16  
FMH



All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese mandate. The full preparation to be completed in November."

2. HIROTA and others are said to have stated: "War with United States would best begin in December or in February."

3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet would likely start war within sixty days."

G2 Note: Full name of individual mentioned above is KOKI HIROTA, who is reported to be a member of the House of Peers, former Premier of Japan and Director of the Bureau of Intelligence, U. S. Section.

Distribution:

All Corps Areas

All Departments

Alaska

FBI

ONI

STATE

File

Source: Dr. Cho

Date of original paper 10/28/41

p. m. s.

I. B. Cognizant

Evaluation—

of source: X Reliable

of information: Credible X

#### URGENT CABLE RECEIVED FROM MANILA NIGHT OF DEC. 3, 1941

We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:

A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways.

2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).

B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.

C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South.

You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu.

cc. Col. Bicknell

Mr. Shivers

Capt. Mayfield

TOP SECRET ULTRA

From London, 31st August 1945

ULTRA

GOR 682 from GCCS 11279

IMPORTANT

Following from C. S. S. for Jones.

A. Colonel Wilkinson who was stationed at Manila and is now with 48000 and temporarily in U. K., was recently approached by Lieutenant Colonel H. C. Clausen, of Judge Advocate General's Department U. S. Army, in connection with investigation of General Short and Admiral Kimmel for Pearl Harbour disaster. He carried credentials from Secretary of War.

B. He brought copies of 2 telegrams from Manila to Honolulu, of November 26th and December 2nd, which were as follows:

1. "November 26th, 1941. Most Immediate. Secret Source (usually reliable) reports:

(a) Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on December 1st without any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view getting between Bangkok and Singapore.

(b) Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing point to be in Songkhla area valuation for above is number 3 repeat 3 (i. e., only about 55 to 60 per cent probable accuracy). American military and naval intelligence Manila informed."

2. "December 3rd, 1941. Most Immediate.

(a) We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:

(I) Accelerated Japanese preparation of airfields and railways.

(II) Arrival since November 10th of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters medium bombers tanks and guns (75 mm).

(b) Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed to Washington November 21st by American Military Intelligence here.

(c) Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and United States. Japan does not repeat not intend attack Russia at present but will act in south. You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu."

C. Colonel C. anxious to know basic source of para. C. of telegram of December 2nd, and in particular, whether this was in "special" category. In point of fact, *para C. was based on a B. J. Wilkinson* was unaware of source and passed information to Honolulu as he appreciated that I possessed no direct communications.

D. As far as can be judged, the earlier information was based on agent's reports, but Clausen only pressing for origin of para C.

E. You should consult with G-2, as security Ultra at stake if this evidence made public.

Wt 55959/7940 30m 3/45 Wa & Co 51/3

#### REFERENCE SHEET

Personal  
Admiralty

TOP SECRET

From: Commander (I. C.), Admiralty, Dated: 16th July, 1945.  
S. W. I. To: Captain Hastings.

A/2277

Herewith copies of both messages referred to on the telephone this morning, Monday.

Commander (I. C.)

Secret

MESSAGE

IN

From: C. O. I. S. Singapore.

Date 8.12.41.  
Received: 0113

Naval Cypher (D) by W/T

Addressed Admiralty (for D. of N. I.) Navy Board Melbourne. Navy Board Wellington, S. O. (I) Hong Kong. N. S. H. Q. Ottawa.

AIDAC

Information received at 2010Z 7th by Hong Kong that severence of Japanese relations ? admitted imminent.

2312Z/7

D. N. I. (4)

O. I. C. (3)

D. S. D. 9

File X

Most Secret

MESSAGE

IN

From: C. O. I. S. Singapore

1746Z/7th December.  
Date 7.12.41.  
Recd. 2112

Naval Cypher O. T. T. by W/T

Addressed Admiralty (D. N. I.)

Immediate

Personal from Consular Special Intelligence dated 7th December. Tokyo inform all Consulates that relations between Japan and Great Britain and United

States are critical. Comment. Message from codeword from table for warning telegram.

1746Z/7

Advance copy sent O. I. C.

D. N. I. (4) Personal  
O. I. C. (3) "  
D. S. D. 9 "

---

COPY OF CABLE RECEIVED NOV. 27, 1941

Secret source (usually reliable) reports that,

A. Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1, repeat Dec. 1, without any ultimatum or declaration of break, with a view to getting between Bangkok and Singapore.

B. Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing point to be in Songkhla area.

Valuation for above is No. 3, repeat 3 (i. e. only about 55 to 60 percent probable accuracy).

AMERICAN Military and Naval Intelligence, Manila, informed.

Copies to: Mr. Shivers

Capt. Mayfield

Col. Bicknell.

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SECRET

6-1

SATURDAY, 11 OCTOBER 1941

2325 i /To KIMURA at P. Hotel, on private line:/ K. and girl. /reception poor/ They are apparently very good friends. Their conversation is about the dispatch of ships to the U. S. K says that X has received a cable re these ships. The Sumitomo Bank and certain other firms will send staff members back. Perhaps TAKAGISHI will go, too. K. goes on to say in English that it may happen "at any moment". /She says goodbye and hangs up. He waits quite some time before hanging up. It is apparent that K. is drunk and not in full possession of whatever faculties he possesses. There was no lovey-dovey talk, however, as in the case of TAKAGISHI. K. is convinced that he may be recalled at any moment and is very sad about it./

END

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SECRET

1-540

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 30

No activity

MONDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1941

1000 o to RCA, for messenger

1045 o to NYK TAKEI from SEKI who says he received a telegraph /to be sent thru X?/ some time ago and wants now to settle accounts. \$45.82. They are bringing the money up today. T. asks about the situation but SEKI doesn't tell him anything startling. TAKEI is worried for not being able to get home, but admits he doesn't know what the situation is. (Doubt if S does either!)

1115 i Inc. to XX, NAKATSUKA quoting an AP dispatch based on Asahi dispatch from Washington that the closing of J. consulate is imminent. First public reference. "Have you had any information?" XX has not had any information from Tokyo to prepare for possible closing (he says). He saw "a few lines" in this morning's Advertiser. XX thinks the Tatuta will leave tomorrow, but on all else he is his usual blank self.

1150 o to HBD for NAKAMURA. Tsukikawa calling re day before yesterday. This morning /it was set ?/ at 9:30—no 10. At X? Yes. /This conversation pretty fast. Translation a little unsure./



- 1305 i For someone who's not there yet. Girl calling.  
 1326 o YOSHIOKA to MATSU/DA?/ Won't you come out in front of the office. /Possible taxi, because he emphasizes the words "in front of."/  
 1330 o for NAKASHIMA. Date with her.  
 1352 o to a girl. NI  
 1405 o to HBD for NAKAMURA. Out. When back? 3 or 4. Well then please /have him call me? First part was missing/.

—END—

SECRET

NYK-38

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1941

- 0830 ? Discussion of the difficult situation resulting from the suspension /of trade?/ Seems to shift to boats or planes. One says something about "doing it on the 14th" and the other says the Matson sailings of the 5th and the 19th are out. Also the airways present a financial problem. The next Matson sailing after is in January. There are no \$110 rooms. Some more talk, most of which I can't get, but I think they are talking about what to do with special reference to getting away. Part with the admonition by one "not to talk too much about war."  
 0950 i His girl to YOSHIOKA. Stolen sweets are the best, but the boss came back in the midst!  
 1052 i YOSHI. Gives girl number 98471 and name Shizuto NISHI /Mrs. Nishi's husband).  
 1119 i YOSHI from pal /to play something or do something/ "Not today." Tomorrow? OK/  
 1155 o to girl. This is NYK. Can you come to the office.  
 1158 o ordering oyako dombun and other food.  
 1435 o to FUKUDA from YOSHIOKA. Not in /He was!/  
 1436 i to YOSHIOKA from FUKUDA about insurance. Personal.  
 1457 i Mr. Lee calling for Mr. Nishi.

At 4 p.m. Honolulu time in the 1941st year of Our Lord, December 2nd inst. I bade my adieu to you my friend of 22 months standing. Darn if I won't miss you!!

Requiescat in Peace.

Y-1 J-1

20 APR 45

FBI files

65-414 phone intercepts 19 Aug-2 Dec. 41.  
 65-414 " " 18 Aug-1 May 41.  
 65-414 " " 30 Apr 41-2 Dec 40.

2-291—

Monday, November 17, 1941

- 0945 i KAWAZOE to VX re TOJO's speech, has VX heard any adverse reactions? VX has not. /Laughter, especially by K./ K. says /I think/ that previously there was talk that speeches were for overseas propaganda. But this time no such statements have come in. No, none have. Not in Japanese either.  
 1117 i FPM. Fragment  
 1313 ? YOSHIOKA and X about money. \$10,000, \$12,000 /the amount they have on hand?/ Apparently X wants to get all the figures, for they figure the taxes, the bond, and all.  
 1317 i From YSB /woman/ reporting something that she has done, and very brief.

—END—

NYK-32

Monday, November 24, 1941

0847 o YOSHIOKA for ? NYK has received a confidential dispatch. Dictates. Translation of the dispatch was made with further details eked out from the NJ for 11-24-41 as follows.

As soon as preparations are completed, the government has decided to dispatch the Tatsuta Maru to Los Angeles, Balboa and the southern regions, the exact time of departure and other details to be announced later, but the Jiji story says she will sail from Yokohama by the end of the month. The Jiji story mentions the 380 Japanese of Panama who are the "victims" of the shut out policy of the government. Anyway, it is clear that a boat will be sent.

0902 o To RCA from YOSHIOKA—NYK. Mrs. NISHI has left, so if there is any wire after hours, please call Mr. T. YOSHIOKA, 75055. If not home, call T. TAKEI, Makiki Hotel 67692 (private line).

0908 o To Commercial Pacific Cable Co. from YOSHIOKA explaining same thing as above.

0933 o YOSHIOKA to girl in Togawa's office. Mostly friendly chatter, but he tells her that a boat is going to L. A. and Balboa. She says she cannot talk too much /probably the boss is around!/ What's he going to do? Oh he'll work around. Y. thinks things are going to be all right now since the Tatsuta is coming.

END

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.

Secret

P1 WAR PRYTY WASHN DC 611PM NOV 27 1941

CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH

472 27th Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment stop If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act stop This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent stop Report measures taken stop Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan stop Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

MARSHALL.

116P/27

Decoded by: Lt. J. H. Babcock, SC, 222P Nov 27, 1941.

Received as Secret communication.

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 472 27TH."



## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,

*Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 November 1941.*

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General:

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority.

Thomas H. Green,  
THOMAS H. GREEN,  
*Lt. Col., J. A. G. D.,  
Department Judge Advocate.*

Sent as Radiogram No. 986—29th.

Approved for Transmission:

O. M. McDole,  
O. M. McDole,  
*Major, A. G. D.,  
Assistant Adjutant General.*

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON D C

Re your secret radio four eight two AG 383.4/13 twenty eighth comma full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren paragraph three mid se thirty dash forty-five end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment stop As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this headquarters by confidential letter dated June Nineteen Nineteen Forty One requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in effect comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and Naval Forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection etc stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June Twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations stop In this connection comma at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June Thirtieth Nineteen Forty One enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and county of Honolulu comma whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense stop The authority thus given has not yet been exercised stop Relations with FBI and all other federal and territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters.

SHORT.

ENC SEC BY

LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC

2:45P 29 NOV 41

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 27 November 1941.

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General:

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority.

Walter C. Phillips,  
WALTER C. PHILLIPS,  
Colonel G. S. C.,  
Chief of Staff.

Sent as Radiogram, No. 959—27th.

CHIEF OF STAFF  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON DC

Reurad four seven two to C/S 27 Nov 41 twentyseventh report department alerted to prevent sabotage Period Liaison with Navy

SHORT.

ENC SEC BY  
LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC  
5:40P 27 NOV 41

Secret Routing 4 December 1941.

#1033-4th

CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

Following report in compliance with instructions contained in Agwar four eight four dash twenty eighth colon instructions contained in subject radiogram issued to all establishments and units under control of Hawaiian Air Force on twenty nine November Stop Entire subject of protection recently received comma and continues to receive detailed and comprehensive attention as result of three reports prepared by special inspector during June and July forty one Stop Para

Additional steps initiated specifically to comply with subject radiogram substantially as follows colon assembly of intelligence officers of major subdivisions of Hawaiian Air Force twenty nine November Stop Personal inspection of stations and activities by Air Force Commander one and two December stop Increase in size of guard where desirable Stop Instructions issued to expedite overhauling of pass system comma civilian and military comma now in progress Stop This entire department is now operating and will continue to operate under an alert for prevention of sabotage activities Stop Para

Secrecy discipline being given all emphases practicable through official and quasi official agencies Stop Work has actually begun on essential protective fencing and flood lighting projects Stop Para

With reference to counter propaganda comma the problem is educational rather than regulatory and at present is being dealt with through the medium of squadron talks Stop Need is felt for a War Department publication paren possible in form of development and expansion of foreword to soldier's handbook comma FM twenty one dash one hundred paren suitably arranged and worded for use of relatively inexperienced personnel comma dealing with status of soldier as citizen comma ideals and doctrines influencing founders of American Government comma structure of Government comma place of military establishment in the structure comma national objectives comma both domestic and international comma together with discussion of those forms of government inimical to Democratic form Stop Signed Martin End

SHORT.

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.

Secret

1549WS WASHINGTON DC 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218P  
CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code



machine immediately Stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly Stop Inform naval authorities of this communication

MARSHALL.

Decoded by: Lt J H Babcock, 251P, Dec. 7, 1941.

Received as a secret communication.

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 529 7th."

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 7 December 1941.

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General:

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority.

C. A. POWELL,  
Lt. Col.,  
Dept. Sig. Off.

Sent as Radiogram No. 1057—7th.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON D C

Japanese enemy dive bombers estimated number sixty attacked Hickam Field Wheeler Field Pearl Harbor at eight am Stop Extensive damage to at least three hangars Wheeler Field three hangers Hickam Field and to planes caught on ground Stop Details not yet known Stop Raid lasted over one hour Stop Unconfirmed report that three ships in Pearl Harbor badly damaged Stop Marine airfield EWA also badly damaged Stop More details later. End  
SHORT.

ENC SECRET URGENT BY  
LT G LENNOX SC  
950A 7 DEC 1941

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 7 December 1941.

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General:

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority.

EARNEST MOORE,  
Major, A. C.,  
Actng., Chief of Staff.

Sent as Radiogram No. 1068—7th.

CHIEF ARMY AIR FORCES  
WASHINGTON DC

Hickam Field Wheeler Field Pearl Harbor attacked simultaneously by Japanese dive bombers for one hour beginning eight oclock seventh December damage severe Stop Have left seven repeat seven B dash seventeen comma six repeat six B dash eighteen comma eight repeat eight A dash twenty comma forty repeat forty pursuit Stop Main part dpot destroyed but limited repair and supply facilities remaining Stop Runways Hickam not damaged Stop Request all possible reinforcement heavy bombardment fully equipped Stop Planes to arrive here during hours of darkness Stop Additional ground personnel will be needed as large part of Air Corps troops are being used in close in defense and anti sabotage guards Stop Additional fighters should be immediately dispatched by carrier together with such dive bombers as can be made available Stop Spare parts should be furnished for all types as there are no stocks on hand Stop Signed Martin.

SHORT.

ENC SEC BY  
LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC  
6:50P 7 DEC 41

## SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.

Secret

P 10 WAR HS 70 WD PRIORITY WASHINGTON DC 110p SEC 8 1941.  
 COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FT SHAFTER T H  
 543 8th TO SHORT FROM ARNOLD ALL REPORTS SHOW THAT IN  
 JAPANESE ATTACKS NUMBERS OF OUR PLANES HAVE BEEN DE-  
 STROYED ON THE GROUND STOP TAKE ALL POSSIBLE STEPS AT  
 ONCE TO AVOID SUCH LOSSES IN YOUR AREA INCLUDING PROMPT  
 TAKEOFF ON WARNING COMMA DISPERSION TO MAXIMUM POSSIBLE  
 EXTENT COMMA AND CONSTRUCTION OF PARAPETS

ADAMS.  
 930P/8/3

[Written:] Ans to the radio delivered to M/C CP 11:55 am Dec 10th. for  
 dispatch.

Rie

Decoded by: LT. G. E. Haven, 1005P Dec 8 1941.

Received as a secret communication.

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 543 8th"

SECRET

## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

## INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff, including the Department C/A, the B&LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: WD Radio #541, 8 Dec 41 "Ground Personnel needed & re impossible to dispatch fighter aircraft by Carrier"	
1st Ind.: AG, 9 Dec 41	C/S.....	Radio referred to attached. 2 Incl.: WD Radio #541-8, HHD Radio #1068-7.	4773, R. H. D. R. H. D. 6 Dec 1941. A. G.
2d Ind.: C/S, 12/9/41..... A/O, 12/9/41.....	Air O..... CS.....	Information..... Noted.....	W. C. P. J. A. M.

Radio WD529 Received Filed at Wash D C 12:18 P M Washington time  
 (or 6:48A Haw time) (ac RCA 1549WS)

Received by RCA at Honolulu 7:33 A M

Delivered to Signal Office at 11:45 A M not marked priority. Other priority  
 mesages handled first

Delivered to decoding officer 2:40 P M decoded and delivered to Col Dunlop  
 2:50 P M

Delivered to Capt Trueman in office of Chief of Staff HHD at 3:00 P M



Re your five four nine.

Radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning seventh received signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but within five minutes paren Stop Deciphered message received by adjutant general HqHawDept two fifty eight, afternoon seventh (received by Chief of Staff HqHawDept three o'clock afternoon seventh all Hawaiian)

SHORT.

10 DEC 1941.

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STATEMENT OF WM. B. COBB, CAPT. J. A. G. D.

On the evening of Sat. Dec. 6th, 1941, Mrs. Cobb and I had returned from Schofield Bks., about midnight, and were invited to spend the night at Hickam Field, with some friends, Lt. F. O. Brown, and his sister, at their quarters in that post. We were awakened at 7:55 the following morning by the attack by enemy planes on Pearl Harbor and Hickman Field. The attacks continued intermittently thruout the morning, and we assisted in such ways as we could, to care for the dead and wounded, until about noon. At that time, I left Hickam Field and proceeded to Ft. Shafter, reporting upon arrival, to my superior, Col. T. H. Green, Dept. Judge Advocate. Volunteer nurses were needed at Tripler General Hospital, and Col. Green made the arrangements for Mrs. Cobb to help there in that work. After taking her to the hospital, I was directed to report to the Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Dept., at Ft Shafter, for duty, which I did at 1:20 P. M., Dec. 7th, 1941.

Upon assuming my duties in the office of the Chief of Staff, I immediately began to keep a personal record of the activities in the office, pursuant to my instructions, and as a matter of ordinary office routine, which record I now have. The telephone system was explained to me, and I was occupied for some time, becoming familiar with the office. The situation was of course, very intense, and numerous officers were calling on the Chief of Staff throughout the afternoon. Col. Green, accompanied by Maj. Hanley, of the Judge Advocate's office were in about 2 P M, and shortly thereafter, left to go to the Crater, to confer with Gen. Short. Col. Phillips was busy with long distance phone calls to Washington, at least one of which I understood to be completed. Some officer, whose name I do not know, called in person to report to the Chief of Staff on the situation at Hickam Field. At about 3 P. M., a secret radio message was received by the Chief of Staff, which was shown to me, and which referred to the fact that the Japanese were serving what amounted to an ultimatum, *at one o'clock P. M. that day*. We were unable to understand the mesasge, inasmuch as the Japanese had made and concluded their assault on Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field, approximately seven hours previously. In discussing the message with Col. Phillips, he remarked that this "must be the message to which Gen. Marshall was referring, and which he asked me if I had received." As I recall, the message was dated and stamped as having been sent from Washington at 12:18 P. M. Dec. 7th, 1941. I am positive that the message was not received by the Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department before 2:55 P. M. Dec. 7th, 1941, at the earliest. Shortly thereafter, I heard the Chief of Staff phone the contents of the message to Gen. Short at the Crater, near Ft. Shafter.

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An additional message was prepared by Col. Phillips, the contents of which I do not know, and I was directed to proceed to Pearl Harbor with the secret message and the second message, and deliver both to Admiral Kimmel. I left Ft. Shafter in an official car at 5:42 P. M. and rushed to Admiral Kimmel's headquarters, where I delivered both messages to his Chief of Staff, Capt. Davis, with whom I conversed for some time. There was more discussion about the time of the secret message and we attempted to account for the delay in transmittal. Thereafter, Admiral Kimmel wrote, in loughand, a message to Gen. Short, consisting of three pages of notepaper about 5 by 7 inches in size, the last of the three being about one half filled with the writing. This message he showed to two other Admirals who were conferring with him, sealed the same, and delivered to me with instructions to deliver it to Gen. Short at once. Before I left Pearl Harbor, an officer whose name is Delaney, but whose rank I do not

know, as he was in civilian clothes, gave me a message concerning the naval vessels which were to enter the harbor that night, so that our coastal batteries would not fire on them. I then returned, with the three messages—the pink secret message, the Admiral's note, and Delaney's advice, to Ft. Shafter, where I arrived at 4:16 P. M. I delivered the messages to Col. Phillips, who opened the Admiral's note, and after reading it, again sealed it with sealing wax, with the assistance of Mr. Emmons in the office, and directed me to take it to the General in the Crater at once, which I did. After reading the message, Gen. Short called Col. Phillips and told him in substance, "I've read the Admiral's note, and will keep it in my personal possession." He then asked me my name, which I gave him, and he directed me to return to Ft. Shafter. The time of my arrival there was 4:40 P. M., after which my attention was occupied by other matters.

WM. M. COBB,  
*Capt. JAGD., Ft. Shafter.*

#### SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE  
Secret

103 WAR HS 144 WD WASHIN DC 112SP DEC 8 1941  
CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER TH

541 8th Attention General Fred Martin Stop Clarify ground personnel needed as requested in secret radio one zero six eight dated December seven Stop The Commanding General Hawaiian Department has been informed of status of ground reinforcements Stop Close in defense and antisabotage guard should be supplied by Commanding General Hawaiian Department Stop State whether personnel requested is Air Corps or ground personnel Stop It is impossible to dispatch fighter aircraft by carrier Stop Additional P dash forty and P dash thirty nine types of aircraft are crated for shipment Stop Final decision reference heavy bombardment for Hawaii is being made this date Stop Notification later.

ADAMS.  
955P/8/8

Received as a secret communication.

Decoded by: S Sgt D L Smith, S Cl 115A 9 December 1941.

Answer should be marked "Answer to Code Message No. 541 8th."

#### HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, *Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 December 1941.*

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority.

E. Moore,  
E. MOORE,  
E. MOORE,  
*Major, Air Corps,  
Chief of Staff.*

Sent as Radiogram No. 1078—8th.

CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES,  
*Washington, D. C.:*

More specific information on questions asked by General Arnold semicolon command alerted prevention sabotage required concentration rather than dispersion Stop All planes now dispersed comma pursuit in bunkers comma bombers can not be bunkered on account of soft ground off runways Stop Local joint agreement places responsibility for search on Navy who may call on Army for help when thought necessary Stop Of planes in ferry flight all landed Oahu two landed small fields and were badly damaged comma one destroyed by gun fire and one badly damaged Stop Attack was a perfectly executed surprise attack in strict accord with our prescribed tactics Stop Dive bombing was highly



accurate Stop Every effort made with few bombers left to locate carriers without success Stop Casualties dead six officers two hundred seven enlisted comma wounded some seriously three sixty seven enlisted Stop Morale high End Martin.

SHORT.

Enc Sec by  
Lt J H Babcock. (Handwritten:) J. B.  
526P Dec 8 1941.  
Note:

(Handwritten:) RCA-1549 WS. Delivered to Sig Office 11:45 not marked Priority to decoding Officer 240P.

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in code:

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

P 3 WAR L 54 WD 1 EXTRA URGENT WASHINGTON DC 219P DEC 9 1941  
CG HAWN DEPT FT SHAFTER T H

*Five four nine ninth* Please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our number five two nine Repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to Staff and by what staff office received.

COLTON, Acting.

(Handwritten:) 529 delivered to C/S 300 PM 7 Dec—receipted for by capt Trueman delivered by Mr Hough; 2:58 PM Col Dunlop) 733A Honolulu, T. H.  
Received as a secret communication.

Decoded by: Lt L G Forbes SC 910 AM Dec 9 1941. (Handwritten:) LGF  
(Handwritten:) Filed 12:18 PM Wash or 6:48 Hon time. Received RCA Honolulu 7:33 A.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 9 December 1941.

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.

Request that the following Secret—Extra Urgent official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is priority.

Walter C. Phillips,  
WALTER C. PHILLIPS,  
2:00 P.

Sent as Radiogram No. 1087—9th.

Approved for transmission:

U. M. McDole,  
U. M. McDole,  
Major, A. G. D.  
Assistant Adjutant General.

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,  
Washington, D. C.:

Re your five four nine radio five two nine received Honolulu by RCA seven thirty three morning seventh Stop. This message delivered signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but within five minutes paren Stop Deciphered message received by adjutant general Hq. Haw Dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh.

SHORT.

Enc. Sec. Extra Urgent by  
(Handwritten:) L G F  
Lt L G Forbes SC  
315P Dec. 9 1941

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 9 December 1941.*

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is priority.

Walter C. Phillips,  
 WALTER C. PHILLIPS, Col., GSC.  
*Chief of Staff.*

Sent as radiogram No. 1094—9th.

Major General H. H. ARNOLD,  
*War Department, Washington, D. C.:*

Re telephone conversation today with Phillips am satisfied.

SHORT.

Enc Sec by  
 Lt G Lennox, S C,  
 730 p 9 Dec. 1941

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 11 December 1941.*

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is priority.

Walter C. Phillips,  
 WALTER C. PHILLIPS, Col., GSC.  
*Chief of Staff.*

Sent as radiogram No. 1112—11th.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
*War Department, Washington, D. C.:*

Reference is made to employment of troops at Christmas comma Canton comma Fiji and New Caledonia Stop. Is the prohibition in Public Resolution number ninety six forbidding the use of units and individuals outside the limits of the United States and possessions thereof rescinded by the declaration of war End.

SHORT.

Enc Sec by D. E. G.  
 (Handwritten:) Lt De George SC  
 1930 11 Dec 41

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

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will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Radio—Merle Smith	
1st Ind., AO, 12/11/41...	C/S-----	1. The attached radio read thru IAAF facilities.	R. L. M., W. G.
2d Ind., C/S, 12/11/41...	AG-----	File-----	W. C. P.

SECRET

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

A-64

11 DEC. 1941.

1 FSU2 PY IMPORTANT GR231

To: Commanding General Honolulu.

From: Merle Smith 18 11th December.

Reports here show no material change on situation of Malaya except Navy loss and indication of enemy troop reinforcements and British reinforcements to the Kota Baru. Malaya area after withdrawal to about 10 miles south Kota Baru, Malaya and Dutch fighters windward to Singapore Stop Miri Sarawak by order proceeding to harbor demolition and aerodrome destruction Stop RAAF bombed Tobl Helen Reef Stop Nauru bombed again contact lost Kure (Ocean Island) Stop Reported that the enemy commander in chief combined air force at Saigon comma same of southern expedition force probably Saigon same of combined fleets and of third fleet at Sama same of South China Fleet near Hong Kong same of fourth fleet in Truk area Stop

Slightly garbled

One of 3rd carrier squadron off Singora one same squadron off Pulaw Kondor 130 miles South Sama one battleship 3 cruisers 11 destroyers off NE Malaya Stop Part of South China Fleet now Jaluit area composition unknown repeat MILID as my 31 MERLE SMITH (garble).

0845 Z / 11

130A

Slightly garbled.

Decoded by AB. Time 815A.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 11 December 1941.

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General.

Request that the following secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is priority.

Walter G. Phillips,  
WALTER G. PHILLIPS,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Chief of Staff.

Sent as radiogram No. 1110—11th.

Message center No. 21.

Time filed 1110.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,

Washington, D. C.:

Following is Paraphrase of Paper #23 this file radio eleven December Forty one received Quote

A-64

1FSU PY IMPORTANT GR231

To: Commanding General Honolulu.

From: Merle Smith 18 11th December.

Reports here show no material change on situation of Malaya except Navy loss and indication of enemy troop reinforcements and British reinforcements to the Kota Baru, Malaya area after withdrawal to about 10 miles south Kota Baru, Malaya and Dutch fighters windward to Singapore Stop Miri Sarawak by order proceeding to harbor demolition and aerodrome destruction Stop RAAF bombed Tobl Helen Reef Stop Nauru bombed again contact

lost Kure (Ocean Island) Stop Reported that the enemy commander in chief combined air force at Saigon Comma same of southern expedition force probably Saigon same of combined fleets and of third fleet at Sama Same of South China Fleet near Hong Kong same of fourth fleet in Truk area Stop

Slightly garbled

One of 3rd carrier squadron off Singora one same squadron off Pulaw Kondor 130 miles south Sama one battleship 3 cruisers 11 destroyers off NE Malaya Stop Part of South China Fleet now Jaluit area composition unknown repeat MILID as my 31 Merle Smith (Garble)

0845 Z/11

130A

Slightly garbled

Unquote end of message.

SHORT.

Enc sec by

Lt. J H Babcock. (Handwritten:) J. B.

150P Dec 11 1951

## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

### INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

#### SECRET

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No. of Ind. Form and Date	To	Subject: WD SEC Radio 529 7th re Ultimatum by Japanese and destruction of their code machine.	
1st Ind. C/S 14 Dec 41....	AG.....	For file. Incl: Subject radio.....	Walter Phillips, Colonel G. S. C., Chief of Staff.

#### CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,  
OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H. 9 July 1941.

In reply refer to:

Subject: Special Report.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. The following report on Hickam Field, Hawaiian Air Force, is submitted pursuant to contents of letter AG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M, from the War Department, Washington, D C., to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated March 26, 1941, subject: "Provisions for Security of Installation", and to conferences held by the undersigned with the General Staff of the Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to determine the Department Commander's policy in respect to additional steps required by the recently declared unlimited emergency.

#### 2. Estimate of the Situation:

a. In respect to the need for increased security for aircraft, supplies and installations, the undersigned has found from the viewpoint of the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and Hickam Field,



that the prevailing attitude of mind toward the immediate need for positive preparations to prevent the success of predictable acts of planned and ordered sabotage does not fully reflect the priority and expressed policy of the responsible officers concerned and therefore must be reported as inadequate.

b. Investigation indicates that a few bold, ruthless and intelligent saboteurs, consisting of inside military operators or civilian employees, could incapacitate Hickman Field or a similar large post on any predetermined night. Also, that the controls now in effect are not and have not been responsible, primarily, for the previous excellent anti-sabotage record, but instead that the principal deterrents have resided in the fact that no lone agent or single fanatic has been operating on his own, while in the meantime no organized plan of concerted sabotage has *as yet been ordered*, or contrawise, that orders, without doubt are in effect forbidding premature acts of sabotage. In connection with the growing local union labor problem and the indication of the F. B. I., it should be taken for granted that Germany has prepared a subversive plan of action for Hawaii, similar to her invariable custom, although the existence of the plan may not have been discovered.

[2] c. In view of the precipitous world events that have occurred subsequent to the recently declared unlimited emergency, and to the crucial test now confronting Germany in her war With Russia, it is found that a considerable portion of the command do not see the mental picture of the interplay of relations now existing between inter-continental theatres of war and our local sphere of action.

(1) Hence, the probability of a local reaction in the form of a quick movement order by the War Department, at the behest of the Navy, of heavy reinforcements from the mainland, or vice versa, of quick movement of all heavy bombardment from Hawaii to Panama or to Manila when land bases are prepared on Midway, Wake and Guam, has not been deduced from such incipient events as;

(a) The possibility at any time of an overt naval retaliation on our part to an overt hostile act either near or far away.

(b) Or, of a final break with the German-Italian Axis.

(c) Or, a rupture with the German-French coalition over conflicting interests in the Caribbean or South China Seas.

(d) Or, an abrupt conflict with Japan over America's proposed aid to Russia.

(e) Or a repercussion in consequence of the recent occupation of Iceland.

(f) Or an occupation of the Galapagos Islands as a result of the conflict between Peru and Ecuador.

(2) Thus the growing importance of Hickam Field as a vital terminal from which to reinforce the Navy quickly with B-17 type bombers from the mainland or from which to reinforce Manila with B-19's and the belief that Hickam will be fully spot-lighted whenever the fleet departs, is not fully comprehended from a sabotage prevention viewpoint.

(3) Such a series of events obviously may force a hostile decision to burn up Hickam Field, by German agents acting alone or by Japanese agents acting jointly in support of her tri-parte pact.

(4) Such a decision would logically precipitate an order for the execution of secretly prepared plan for sabotage.

[3] (5) Such an order, of course, will be preempted whether hostile powers consider it imperative to prevent us from quickly reinforcing our far-flung critical areas with the only decisive influence against sea forces in the the narrow seas that can be employed en mass within tactical times over strategical theatres of 2500 miles extent. (As an illustration of the precept in mind see copy of G-2 map for July 9, 1941.)

d. Hence it is considered that additional security measures required to protect all services necessary to quickly employ this vital far-striking weapon should be preconceived now and receive *first* consideration over all other types of military field forces in Hawaii, while medium bombardment, air-borne infantry transports, and pursuit necessary to secure all outlying fields should receive the next highest consideration. In brief, it is estimated that long-range forces have become the initial line of defense for the safe movement into action of either the Army or Navy regardless of whether either body constitutes the first line of national defense. This estimate is based upon the fact that hostile powers first organize an immediate state of air readiness and seek *first*, by any and all means, to destroy the opposing state of air-readiness.

### 3. General Findings:

a. Reference the axiom that a stable system of personnel control is commonly acknowledged by all authorities to be the one dominant consideration to successful prevention of subversive activities, the undersigned finds that the recently assigned commanders of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and Hickam Field, have inherited an unexpected emergency status without having inherited, from preceding administrations, the standards of administration, organization and management which are now required to master the present borderline war situation.

b. He finds that the Commanding General, 18th Wing, Hawaiian Air Force, is faced with the concurrent task of reforming and recovering control of a highly unstable personnel situation while conducting an intensified transition training to new types of aircraft and an intensified ground security program, without disrupting the continued development and maintenance of such a sizable city as Hickam Field.

c. He finds that the present unstable status and condition is due:

(1) To the ingrained habits of peace-time.

(2) To the carefree sense of easy control born in the isolation of a tropical island garrisoned by large forces.

(3) To the existence of army posts built in peace-time for peace-time occupancy instead of war-time security.

(4) To the relative inattention accorded in peacetime to intelligence functions as compared to that given to operations and supply functions.

(5) To the necessary restraint exercised in making critical reports on sabotage control and natural conflict between need for secrecy and need for information.

(6) To the normal pre-occupation of military personnel with heavily increased routine administration.

(7) To conflicting problems arising out of the rapid expansion of the Air Force.

(8) To the first need, regardless of increased danger of sabotage, for the quick employment of civilians of widely varying types from the mainland to construct buildings and grounds.

(9) To the second need for enlisting recruits and for commissioning reserve officers to activate new units.

(10) To the third need for organizing new combat crews and for inserting new men into jobs of both a confidential and secret nature.

(11) To the lower priority accorded intelligence in consequent of the above first needs.

(12) To the diversion of daily attention to the daily conflicts between new projects, maneuvers, exercises and normal training schedules and daily post duties.

(13) To the deceptive existence of tranquil peace-time law and order now existing within the territory and misplaced reliance on the vouched-for reliability of all civil service employees.

(14) To the loss of aggressive initiative implicit in a purely defensive waiting attitude.

(15) To the fact that no serious evidence of factual record exists, from which to induce the proof that a critical need at present exists for a critical concern for the future.

(16) To congestion in water transport service and local shortages of labor and materials required to meet the needs of all arms and services.

[5] d. It is considered that the present unstable status of personnel control has been caused by the excessive rotation of men within and between squadrons, departments, and daily mass details, due in turn:

(1) To a roughly one hundred percent turnover of individual men periodically to the mainland.

(2) To a roughly two hundred percent expansion with recruits and reserve officers within the past year.

(3) To a roughly three hundred percent dilution of experienced trained men caused by the creation of new units and by the increased overhead growth of higher echelons.

(4) To the initial need for centralizing recruit training.

(5) To the initial need for decentralizing by not duplicating technical school courses at Wheeler and Hickam Fields.

(6) To the initial need for centralizing mass instruction in infantry drill and ground security missions.



(7) To the present need for centralizing the messing and housing of several thousand men in a consolidated mess hall, kitchen and barracks.

(8) To the continuing need for maintaining detachments on outlying islands and for detailing men to various and sundry other outside assignments in the Department.

(9) To the prevailing need in Hawaii to specialize in centralized athletics.

(10) To the present need for absorbing 700 recruits, assigned without a proportionate increase in grades and ratings, who require preliminary recruit and technical school training.

(11) To the continuing need, in consequence, for detailing trained specialists from the Service Departments and Tactical Squadrons to guard, police, drill, and for other post special duties which are required to maintain a command that comprises approximately 25 squadrons and over 100 separate specialized divisions, departments, and sections.

(12) To the culminating cause and effect which has resulted in the growth over several years time of a seriously under-organized form of security and an over-complicated administration of it.

[6] 4 *Special Findings:*

a. Reference the common justice of the uniformly accepted Army axiom to the effect that every basic unit such as the Air-Squadron must possess a practical working knowledge of each and every man under its immediate legal jurisdiction—this to include each man's intelligence, physical, trade, experience, and "trait" data and must possess a daily knowledge of the whereabouts of each man. The undersigned finds that the following complications exist under the present set-up:

(1) Five or more different applications of the War Department's prescribed standardization of statistical control in personnel administration centers exist in the Department.

1st—At Schofield, one regiment centralizes separate company personnel units in regimental headquarters.

2nd—Another regiment centralizes composite battalion units in regimental headquarters.

3rd—Another regiment centralizes the separate specialized functions that are common to all companies in regimental headquarters.

4th—Wheeler Field centralizes its separate squadron units in the Wing Headquarters.

5th—Hickam Field centralizes its separate squadron units in three Group Headquarters (i. e., 17th Air Base Group and the 5th and 11th Bombardment Groups) to which other separate squadron units of the Wing are attached.

(2) Group Headquarters maintains the squadron service records, payrolls, reports of changes, etc.

(3) Squadron Headquarters maintains the duty rosters, morning and sick reports, laundry and collection sheets, etc.

(4) Group and Squadron systems are different in detail to various degrees.

(5) Under conditions noted in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, it is impractical for all men who are detached daily on special duty to attend squadron roll calls at reveille, meal hours and retreat.

[7] (6) The control of absentees and a knowledge of the whereabouts during the night and working day of large numbers of men devolves mainly upon the various noncommissioned officers or enlisted clerks in charge of numerous offices, who endeavor to keep track of daily changes in rosters and who report to Squadron Headquarters when and if absences in attendance occur. Squadron Headquarters reports daily to Group Headquarters such changes with which they have knowledge. Group Headquarters makes required reports direct to Department or to Wing Headquarters. Wing Headquarters makes required reports direct to Department Headquarters and to the Hawaiian Air Force Headquarters—but in the interim of two, three or more days consumed between the reports en route from the Squadron to the Department or from the Department to the Squadron, it is found that the Air Force, Wing, or Group Headquarters have, in the meantime, issued special orders which require daily squadron action. In all such events, the Wing calls upon the Base Group and Tactical Groups. The Group calls on the Squadrons, which in turn calls back upon the various base departments for the changes or exchanges of men required to comply with whatever the daily emergency dictates.

(7) Due to the fact that one of the numerous base departments may receive varying details from various squadrons, while one of numerous squadrons may detail men to various departments, it is obvious that close daily control obtained from close daily coordination between intelligence and personnel is physically dissembled through the existing channels of communication. Daily management is thereby prevented rather than preempted by the system itself.

(8) This vital defect in the daily timing of coordination throughout all intermediate echelons between the squadron and the Department is further complicated by the insertion of Army District Commanders and Naval Commanders in the channels of communications which govern the relations of S-2 intelligence functions with S-3 operations, S-4 supply, and S-1 personnel functions.

(9) Due also to the fact that the tactical and service squadrons are not relatively self-contained units, similar to infantry companies, it is found that the chain of personnel-control and the chain of intelligence-control must be coordinated regularly and systematically in the lower echelons in order to insure daily security.

(10) In further consideration of conditions set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 above, combined with the further fact that the intelligence and the front-line capabilities of the squadrons are further adversely affected by the separate variation in the timing of the mass of personnel, operations, materiel, flight and command communications flowing daily between the Department to the Squadron and the Squadron to the [8] Department, the undersigned finds that a *standard* system of systematic daily coordination throughout all echelons in both Wings of the Hawaiian Air Force is now a necessity.

(11) That the excessive complications of the present set-up may be simplified by grouping the agencies, functions, and sub-centers of coordination, uniformly and commonly alike into five standard divisions throughout all echelons of command. For this purpose, authority should be granted to rearrange existing tentative Base Group tables of organization into a more natural operative form using the proposed "maintenance service command" and "operations control office" and "grand security troops" as a basis.

(12) That principal activities, main delays, untoward legal incidents, and important cooperative contacts should be reported upward daily from the Squadron by each of the five standard divisions to all command echelons in the Air Force for successive staff coordination of daily difficulties over which the lower echelons have no direct control.

##### 5. Detailed Findings:

a. In the spirit of cooperation the following detailed findings in a large part were prepared jointly by the undersigned and Headquarters of the Commanding General, 18th Wing, who has initiated action or prepared a plan of action and with whom this report has been previously coordinated in conjunction with the Inspector General's report.

##### b. Command Division:

(1) That a complete list of all prepared plans and recommendations of the Commanding General, 18th Wing, be brought to the personal attention of the Department Commander to insure a formal decision in respect to required priorities and time limits prescribed by the Department for the guidance and compliance of the Department Engineer.

(2) That the status and condition of Hickam Field be treated as one necessitating a formal regard for the serious legal consequences involved.

(3) That intelligence functions be assigned to the five functional divisions of the Wing; to wit (1) command intelligence, (2) personnel intelligence, (3) operations intelligence, (4) material intelligence and (5) flight intelligence.

[9] (4) That the Chief of the Wing Inspection Department be furnished a list of critical items mentioned hereinafter for collaboration, inspection and report.

(5) That a Chief of a Wing Plans and Intelligence Section be organized as a fifth section of the staff and work similar to the Inspection Department, under the direct control of the Wing Commander.

(6) That the Chief Executive of the Wing exercise a more exclusive and separate sense of control over his associate executives who are charged



especially with the responsibility for coordination of the agencies in personnel, operations, and matériel divisions.

(7) That a special investigation, comment and recommendations be directed to determine the underlying causes for the reported discontent and lowered morale of the junior officer and private soldier; this in order to separate the effects of self-inflicted disaffection from the effects of possible subversive agents.

*c. Personnel Division:*

(1) That the personnel administration centers be standardized within the Hawaiian Air Force.

(2) That the interior watchmen, guard and security functions at Hickam Field be organized with separate grades and ratings into an organic detachment similar to the set-up in effect in the Navy at Pearl Harbor, the Hawaiian Division at Schofield and the Hawaiian Headquarters at Fort Shafter.

(3) That the general consolidated mess be similarly organized into a semi-permanent department with direct control of its separate officers, men, grades and ratings, similar to the practice in the Navy.

(4) That the additional equipment and installations urgently needed by the general mess be expedited in every way possible to prevent the recurrence of the recent epidemic of stomach disorder.

(5) That all serious illegalities committed by enlisted men be coordinated with the Flight Surgeon for a physiological "trait" analysis and report to S-2.

(6) That a special morale report be required as to the status of the swimming pool, gymnasium, motion picture theatre, and low cost housing program with estimated dates of completion.

[10] (7) That an Assistant S-1 be assigned as Director of Morale, Recreation and Athletics, similar to the position created in the Hawaiian Division, and that he give special attention to such items as the acquisition of six additional tennis courts and the maintenance of the six courts now in use, etc.

(8) That daily Squadron Work Sheets showing the actual daily physical location of assigned men be prepared daily by all Squadrons.

(9) That centralized recruit training and centralized technical school courses be set-up as a separate organic department and made to function as a personnel replacement center directly under the control of Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force similar in general purpose to the Hawaiian Air Depot which acts as a Materiel Replacement Center.

(10) That a minimum number of men, grades and ratings, be set up for each service division, department and section of the Base which constitutes the relatively *constant* permanent overhead of the station whether or not one, two or more Groups are assigned thereto.

(11) That a standard system of control governing the promotion of all men within the ratios of grades and ratings prescribed for the command, service and combat divisions, be based predominantly upon the efficiency report and the recommendation of the operating departments.

(12) That a complete list of day and night shifts for all types of tours of duty be prepared to counteract the inaccurate impression created in the Department by seeing numerous unemployed "off duty" men about the station.

(13) That the remaining men only be made available for guard and security in the form of a separate organic department composed preferably of infantrymen.

(14) That the informal recommendations of the Infantry Liaison Officer, Hickam Field, be submitted formally and that his recommendation for the type and number of men and weapons required be favorably considered; also, that officers assigned to ground defense and security wear side-arms.

(15) That the guard at the main gate be equipped with accessories necessary to operate a recording machine that will automatically check the license number of all cars entering and leaving the post.

[11] (16) That enlisted guards be requested to avoid carrying on extended conversation with strangers or from being diverted by people of either sex when on duty.

(17) That men employed on the line and in the engineering shops be furnished distinctive arm bands, or straps, or caps, or other means of controlling any unnecessary inter-flow of personnel within the station.

(18) That special instructions in writing be furnished the guard and patrols to check all parking plans in order to insure as far as possible that no unauthorized car with hidden personnel or materiel is permitted to remain over-night on the station.

(19) That in the absence of daytime guards, the Chief Clerk of principal departments be issued pistols.

(20) That S-1 maintain a list and check on all enlisted men who may be taking civilian flying instruction.

(21) That the Fire Department be instructed in writing to judge carefully the question of not employing all equipment at any one time on brush, cane or small fires at a distance beyond quick recall.

(22) That the question of any heavy indebtedness of young officers for autos and uniforms be re-checked.

(23) That cases of heavy indebtedness of enlisted men at the Post Exchange and Non-commissioned Officers' Club be re-checked.

(24) That enlisted men and civilian employees with bad police records be returned to the mainland.

(25) That the vital question of food and water poisoning receive increasing daily attention and that the question of alien servants be re-checked.

(26) That a special study and report be made of the specific causes for dissatisfaction with the pay and promotion of enlisted guard and of the distribution of air mechanics and flying pay to enlisted men.

(27) That the wide variation between Squadrons in the internal distribution of pay, including air mechanics pay, flying pay, pay for grades and ratings, and special pay (exclusive of per diem allowances) be made the subject of a special study and report with the view of creating a more uniform control of the minimum amounts that should be assigned to vital specialties [12] such as squadron mess, communications, armament, maintenance, without adversely affecting the basic combat crew's need for first priority of flying pay.

(28) That S-1 offices, officers and functions be separated organically from that of the Adjutant General's office throughout all echelons.

(29) That consideration be given to extending the excellent practice of the travelling nurse in the Depot to married non-commissioned officers and civilian employee families of Hickam Field.

#### *d. Operations Division:*

(1) That all photographic mosaics of Hickam Field and the island of Oahu be re-checked and numbered.

(2) That all plats of communication systems and terminals be checked and numbered.

(3) That a technical Signal expert be required to recheck the proposed use of communications personnel set-up in the various alert, security and defense plans to prevent conflict.

(4) That field orders which prescribe various degrees of readiness be re-checked in connection with Plans for Ground Security, Alert Plans and Plan for the Evacuation of Civilians, in order to prevent conflict in the successive or concurrent execution of such plans and orders.

(5) That no intermediate supervisor of heavy bombardment training be interposed, for an extended period, between Wing Headquarters and the Commanding Officers of either tactical group, contrary to the due rights and process vested in duly constituted commanders who are legally responsible in the event of riot, disorder, aircraft fatalities and for the safety and security of their command pursuant to the orders of duly constituted higher commanders.

(6) That the action required by the Wing Plan to increase the lighting of critical areas along the hangar-line, dead-line, and under parked aircraft be expedited.

(7) That instructions governing the supervision of the amateur radio operators be reduced to writing.

(8) That special instructions governing the supervision of chemicals, ordnance and armament, to include heavy demolitions that lie in the open at outlying fields and for the safe-guarding [13] of bombsights on over-night stops be reviewed in the light of emergency conditions.



(9) That the storage and shortage of water, and exposed pipelines at out-lying fields be considered critical from an operating standpoint as well as a ground security viewpoint.

(10) That the custody of keys to all small arms be reviewed and reduced to writing to include the names of individuals possessing keys to racks and vaults.

(11) That security measures to prevent tapping of telephone wires between Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields be reduced to writing and frequent practice.

(12) That the question of developing an auxiliary mobile message center in an air transport equipped especially with a receiving and sending set, wire and repair men, be considered.

(13) That the recommendations of the Hawaiian Air Force Signal Officer in reference to safe-guarding of critical radio and telephone terminals be re-submitted and receive favorable action.

(14) That additional measures, such as voice code, be prescribed and tested to insure the authenticity of parties who transmit telephone messages and that private soldiers be excluded from duty of transmitting important verbal orders of serious purport.

*e. Materiel Division:*

(1) That the present inspection of the aqua system, to include periodic chemical analysis of oil as well as gas, be revised and prescribed in writing as a part of an intelligence pamphlet and that it include further safe-guards against the danger of leaking containers in buildings and the pollution of lubricating oil in critical pieces of heavy machinery. Also, that the cooperation and technical advise, in this respect, of the shop superintendent, Hawaiian Air Depot, be solicited.

(2) That the openings under the platform of the Hickman Field dock at the head of the aqua system be further secured by some form of a gate that will prevent any unauthorized small boats from planting explosives under the dock.

(3) That additional protective security measures to safe-guard all man-holes and terminals for water, light, power, sewage, compressed air and communications be requested of the District Engineer as a separate project.

[14] (4) That a list be obtained from all Squadron Engineers and prepared by Wing S-4, of all items on B-17 type aircraft that are considered to be "critical", such as the electrical fuel pumps, the apertures under the main wings in which small explosives may be hidden, the main control cables, the connection of control cables with the servo drums of the automatic pilot, the heavy lead counter-weight in the tail of the fuselage, slits or punctures in the rubber tires, etc.

(5) That the daily inspections required by Form 41, Standard Air Corps Maintenance and Inspection System, be increased by local orders to include such a selected list of "critical" items.

(6) That a time limit or priority for the completion of work required of the Engineer Corps in the Wing Plan for screening, lighting and fencing of Hickam Field be prescribed, particularly, by special order.

(7) That second line of maintenance in the Base Engineering Shop be rendered more self-contained and independent of third line of maintenance in the Depot, in order that Hickam Field may carry-on if and when the Depot is incapacitated; also that the additional power lines for the Base Engineering Shops, for which funds, it is understood, have been available to the Engineers for several months, be put on a prescribed priority list by the Department.

(8) That rotation of technical workers assigned to the shops be sharply reduced, in order to prevent one link or another in the chain of shop management from breaking the completion of daily work orders.

(9) That the Base Supply Department receive the same corrective consideration as the Base Engineering Department for the same reasons.

(10) That the space occupied by the Engineer lumber piles that were stacked at the end of the runway, previous to the special inspection of the Depot, be further cleared of lumber and scrub growth to allow an unobstructed night approach to the diagonal runway and that this area be smoothly leveled to allow an inadvertent landing short of the runway as well as to prevent a concealed approach to the paint and oil section of the Depot.

(11) That all plats and diagrams of electrical, water, sewage and gasoline systems be re-checked and numbered.



[15] (12) That copies of the detailed findings of the Hawaiian Air Depot at Hickam Field and post orders and regulations in the premise be furnished the District Engineer Detachment at Hickam Field with request that a copy of report of action taken be furnished.

(13) That additional measures for night-time security be prescribed to prevent the unauthorized use of gas trucks or other similar civilian or military vehicles that might be employed by a subversive operator to spread a large amount of leaking gasoline over critical areas around the shops, hangars and dead-line.

(14) That the status of all civilian foremen of the Quartermaster, Supply, Fire Department, etc. who control nearly all utilities that can tie up the operation of a military city be re-checked with a view of giving them increased personal consideration and privileges designed to enhance social morale.

(15) That the execution of plans for increasing the number and length of runways on Hickam Field and the island of Oahu be expedited.

#### *f. Flight Division:*

(1) That flight and airplane commanders, especially of B-17 type of bombardment aircraft be formally delegated the legal responsibility of a commander in a sense similar to that delegated to Train Commanders in Army Regulations.

(2) That each airplane commander be held directly and legally responsible for the intelligence functions of his combat crew in flight.

(3) That each airplane commander be also held directly and legally responsible for the related functions of his flight plan, the coordination of flight communications, and the supervision of pre-flight inspection, loading, dress, discipline, and tactical reports.

#### *6. Conclusions:*

a. That the measurable degree of sinking morale is due to a feeling of instability, bias, or lack of confidence in the general set-up, not to the effects of subversive activities within the command; although such a condition naturally provides a more fertile breeding grounds for hostile proclivities.

b. That a standard outline of organization and system of coordination is required for the Air Force, to include a prompt revision of tables of organization for the Air Base Group.

[16] c. That a list of priorities covering all pending projects for Hickam Field be approved and directed by the Department for the guidance of the Department Engineers, and that a monthly "degree of completion report" be furnished to insure compliance within prescribed time limits.

#### *7. Recommendations:*

That the Department Commander authorize a board of general officers of the Hawaiian Air Force to constitute the uniform standards of organization and standard system of coordination required by present conditions and the existing emergency.

#### *8. Appreciations:*

a. Appreciation is expressed for the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and of Mr. Shivers, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

b. The cooperation of Lieutenant Colonel James A. Mollison, Chief of Staff, of Lieutenant Colonel Parker Tenney, Inspector General of Hawaiian Air Force, and Major A. W. Meehan, G-3, is acknowledged.

c. The spirit of open honesty and helpfulness displayed by Brigadier General J. H. Rudolph, regardless of his own immediate duty for administering the necessary changes from a peace-time status to a critical border-line war-time condition, is considered worthy of commendation.

d. Reference paragraph 5, subparagraph a above, it is appreciated that the present status is the product of several years growth therefore only a collective sense of responsibility is at issue.

e. For above reason, a copy of this report has been furnished the Commanding General, 18th Wing, with a request that he register any difference of facts or opinion and attach thereto a copy of his prepared plans or actions that have already been initiated by his headquarters.

H. S. Burwell,  
H. S. BURWELL,  
Colonel, A. C.,  
Special Inspector.

## CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 May 1941.*

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Major General Frederick L. Martin, U. S. A., Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941 on the above subject.

2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect to see if airplanes, supplies, and Maintenance Buildings are adequately guarded.

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

By courier, 1 May 1941.

CARL GROSSE,  
Major, A. G. D.,  
*Assistant Adjutant General*

## CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 15 July 1941*

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Brigadier General Maxwell Murray, U. S. A., Schofield Barracks, T. H.

With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941, request information as to when a reply may be expected.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

O. M. McDole,  
O. M. McDole,  
Major, A. G. D.  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

1st. Ind.

AG 383.4 (7-15-41)

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HQ. SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, T. H., July 17, 1941.—To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

General Murray took this subject up personally with General Short, making a verbal reply.

For the Commanding General:

Edward Jenkins,  
EDWARD JENKINS,  
*Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,*  
*Acting Adjutant General.*

## CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 25 August 1941.*

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Major General Frederick L. Martin, U. S. A., Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.

With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941, and follow-up letter 15 July 1941, request that reply be expedited.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

ROBERT H. DUNLOP,  
Colonel, A. G. D.,  
*Adjutant General.*



## SECRET

## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

## INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department of Staff, including the Department C/A, the B&LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communications.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations	
1st Ind. AG 18 Nov 41.	C/S-----	Herewith reports from major echelon Commanders in compliance with 3rd R/S Indorsement C/S to AG, 29 April 41, in file marked "HERE". 6 Incls: #1—Report General Murray. #2— " Colonel Walsh. #3— " Colonel Capron. #4— " General Gardner. #5— " General Martin. #6—AG file 383.4 (Secret).	R. U. D.
2d Ind. C/S 11/18/41, #117.	G-2-----	Study & Report-----	W. D.
3d Ind. G-2 16 Jn 42.	AG-----	For file. No report made-----	

## CONFIDENTIAL

## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

## INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

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No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations	4259
1st Ind. Air O. 11/17/41..	C/S-----	There is attached special report on Hickam Field together with comments thereon by the Hawaiian Air Force Staff and General Martin. 1 Incl.: Chart showing Burwell Report, General Martin's Comments and Staff Comments. For the Air Officer: Study and report.	M. J. A. M. 02792
2nd Ind. C/S 11/18/41, #118.	G-2-----		N. CO.
3 Ind. G-20 16 Jn 42....	A. G. 1....	For file—no report made.	KJF.

## Comments on Burwell Report

Burwell's Report	Staff comments	General Martin's comments
<p>Subject: Special Report. To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.</p> <p>1. The following report on Hickam Field, Hawaiian Air Force, is submitted pursuant to contents of letter AG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M, from the War Department, Washington, D. C., to the Commanding General, dated March 26, 1941, subject: "Provisions for security of Installations", and to conferences held by the undersigned with the General Staff of the Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to determine the Department Commander's policy in respect to additional steps required by the recently declared unlimited emergency.</p> <p>2. <i>Estimate of the Situation:</i></p> <p>a. In respect to the need for increased security for aircraft, supplies and installations, the undersigned has found from the viewpoint of the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and Hickam Field, that the prevailing attitude of mind toward the immediate need for positive preparations to prevent the success of predictable acts of planned and ordered sabotage does not fully reflect the expressed policy of the responsible officers concerned and therefore must be reported as inadequate.</p> <p>b. Investigation indicates that a few bold, ruthless and intelligent saboteurs, consisting of inside military operators or civilian employees, could incapacitate Hickam Field or a similar large post on any predetermined night. Also, that the [2] controls now in effect are not and have not been responsible, primarily, for the previous excellent anti-sabotage record, but instead that the principal deterrents have resided in the fact that no lone agent or single fanatic has been operating on his own, while in the meantime no organized plan of concerted sabotage has <i>as yet been ordered</i>, or contrawise, that orders, without doubt are in effect forbidding premature acts of sabotage. In connection with the growing local union labor problem and the indication of the F. B. I., it should be taken for granted that Germany has prepared a subversive plan of action for Hawaii, similar to her invariable custom, although the existence of the plan may not have been discovered.</p> <p>c. In view of the precipitous world events that have occurred subsequent to the recently declared unlimited emergency, and to the crucial test now confronting Germany in her war with Russia, it is found that a considerable portion of the command do not see the mental picture of the interplay of relations now existing between inter-continental theatres of war and our local sphere of action.</p> <p>(1) Hence, the probability of a local reaction in the form of a quick movement order by the War Department, at the behest of the Navy, of heavy reinforcements from the mainland, or vice versa of quick movement of all heavy bombardment from Hawaii to Panama or to Manila when land bases are prepared on Midway, Wake and Guam, has not been deduced from such incipient events as:</p> <p>[5] (a) The possibility at any time of an overt naval retaliation on our part to an overt hostile act either near or far away.</p>	<p>Concur. However, it is believed the condition will be corrected as experience is gained and discipline is improved.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>So far as the majority of the command is concerned this probably is true, however it is believed that responsible command and staff officers of all echelons are cognizant of the situation as it may affect the Hawaiian Air Force.</p>	<p>While this may have been true at the time, this survey was started during the elapsed time since, the lower echelon commanders have become impressed with the need for increased precautions to prevent acts of sabotage.</p> <p>This will always be difficult to prevent but is becoming increasingly more difficult of accomplishment due to the fact that all concerned are indoctrinated with the need for constant vigilance.</p> <p>As many intelligent men throughout the United States fail to understand the significance of international events, it can not be expected that all members of this command can properly evaluate these events, nor is that necessary. Command and staff officers keep informed as to the situation as it affects the Hawaiian Air Force.</p>



- (b) Or, of a final break with the German Italian Axis.
- (c) Or, a rupture with the German-French coalition over conflicting interests in the Caribbean or South China Seas.
- (d) Or, an abrupt conflict with Japan over America's proposed aid to Russia.
- (e) Or a repercussion in sequence of the recent occupation of Iceland.
- (f) Or an occupation of the Galapagos Islands as a result of the conflict between Peru and Ecuador.

(2) Thus the growing importance of Hickam Field as a vital terminal from which to reinforce the Navy quickly with B-17 type bombers from the mainland or from which to reinforce Manila with -19's and the belief that Hickam will be fully spotlighted, whenever the fleet departs, is not fully comprehended from a sabotage prevention viewpoint.

(3) Such a series of events obviously may force a hostile decision to burn up Hickam Field, by German agents acting alone or by Japanese agents acting jointly in support of her tri-partite pact.

[4] (4) Such a decision would logically precipitate an order for the execution of secretly prepared plan for sabotage.

(5) Such an order, of course, will be preempted whether hostile powers consider it imperative to prevent us from quickly reinforcing our farflung critical areas with the only decisive influence against sea forces in the narrow seas that can be employed en masse within tactical times over strategical theatres of 2,500 miles extent. (As an illustration of the precept in mind see copy of G-2 map for July 7, 1941.)

d. Hence it is considered that additional security measures required to protect all services necessary to quickly employ this vital far-striking weapon should be preconceived now and receive *first* consideration over all other types of military field forces in Hawaii, while medium bombardment, airborne infantry transports, and pursuit necessary to secure all outlying fields should receive the next highest consideration. In brief, it is estimated that long-range forces have become the initial line of defense for the safe movement into action of either the Army or Navy regardless of whether either body constitutes the first line of national defense. This estimate is based upon the fact that hostile powers first organize an immediate state of air readiness and seek *first*, by any and all means, to destroy the opposing state of air-readiness.

### 3. General Findings:

a. Reference the axiom that a stable system of personnel control is commonly acknowledged by all authorities to be the one dominant consideration to [5] successful prevention of subversive activities, the undersigned finds that the recently assigned commanders of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and Hickam Field, have inherited an unexpected emergency status without having inherited, from preceding administrations, the standards of administration, organization and management which are now required to master the present border-line war situation.

b. He finds that the Commanding General, 18th Wing, Hawaiian Air Force, is faced with the concurrent task of reforming and recovering control of a highly unstable personnel situation while conducting an intensified transition training to new types of aircraft and an intensified ground security program, without disrupting the continued development and maintenance of such a sizable city at Hickam Field.

Strongly concur. It is believed that the development of a strong striking force of heavy bombardment aviation in the Hawaiian Department is imperative to the safety of the Hawaiian Islands. It is further believed that a collision of air forces will occur prior to and independent of any activities of defending ground forces.

Concur. However it is pointed out that the component parts of the H. A. F. are organized in the same way as are those of the Air Force as a whole. Any change made must of necessity apply not only here but to all Air Force organizations. It is believed the present A. C. squadrons should be reorganized and given an internal organization structurally similar to that of a battalion. G-3 does not concur with the foregoing so far as battalion organization is concerned.

It is impossible for any wing to function to the maximum capabilities with the numerous diversions of personnel to duties not provided for in any existing tables of organization.

Concur. The long range bomber is the only offensive weapon available to the Department Commander, it will be first into action and will so remain as long as available. The importance of this weapon dictates every possible protection from all available sources that it may be immune from sabotage.

This statement infers that a change in organization is necessary to meet changed conditions. It is held that the present organization is satisfactory to cope with the existing circumstances.

Concur with Staff Comments.

Burwell's Report	Staff comments	General Martin's comments
<p>c. He finds that the present unstable status and condition is due:</p> <p>(1) To the ingrained habits of peace-time.</p> <p>(2) To the carefree sense of easy control born in the isolation of a tropical island garrisoned by large forces.</p> <p>(3) To the existence of army posts built in peace-time for peace-time instead of war-time security.</p> <p>(4) To the relative inattention accorded in peace-time to intelligence functions as compared to that given to operations and supply functions.</p> <p>(5) To the necessary restraint exercised in making critical reports on sabotage control and natural conflict between need for secrecy and need for information.</p> <p>(6) To the normal pre-occupation of military personnel with heavily increased administration.</p> <p>(7) To conflicting problems arising out of the rapid expansion of the Air Force.</p> <p>(8) To the first need, regardless of increased danger of sabotage, for the quick employment of civilians of widely varying types from the mainland to construct buildings and grounds.</p> <p>(9) To the second need for enlisting recruits and for commissioning reserve officers to activate new units.</p> <p>(10) To the third need for organizing new combat crews and for inserting new men into jobs of both a confidential and secret nature.</p> <p>(11) To the lower priority accorded intelligence in consequent of the above first needs.</p> <p>(12) To the diversion of daily attention to the daily conflicts between new projects, maneuvers, exercises and normal training schedules and daily post duties.</p> <p>(13) To the deceptive existence of tranquil peace-time law and order now existing within the territory and misplaced reliance on the vouched-for reliability of all civil service employees.</p> <p>(14) To the loss of aggressive initiative implicit in a purely defensive waiting attitude.</p> <p>(15) To the fact that no serious evidence of factual record exists, from which to induce the proof that a critical need at present exists for a critical concern for the future.</p> <p>(16) To congestion in water transport service and local shortages of labor and materials required to meet the need of all arms and services.</p> <p>d. It is considered that the present unstable status of personnel control has been caused by the excessive rotation of men within and between squadrons, departments, and daily mass details, due in turn:</p> <p>(1) To a roughly one hundred percent turnover of individual men periodically to the mainland.</p> <p>(2) To a roughly two hundred percent expansion with recruits and reserve officers within the last year.</p> <p>(3) To a roughly three hundred percent dilution of experienced trained men caused by the creation of new units and by the increased overhead growth of higher echelons.</p> <p>(4) To the initial need for centralizing recruit training.</p>	<p>A minor contributing factor. Not concurred in.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur but unavoidable.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur in the fact that the sabotage potentialities are great but the assumption that the Department or the H. A. F. is not cognizant of the situation is not concurred in.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Unavoidable.</p> <p>Unavoidable.</p> <p>Unavoidable.</p> <p>Corrected by establishment of recruit casual camp at Bellows Field.</p>	<p>Concur in all Staff Comments pertaining to paragraph c.</p> <p>Unavoidable in processing and assigning recruits to old organizations and creating new ones.</p>



(5) To the initial need for decentralizing by not duplicating technical school courses at Wheeler Field and Hickam Field.

(6) To the initial need for centralizing mass instruction in infantry drill and ground security missions.

(7) To the present need for centralizing the messing and housing of several thousand men in a consolidated mess hall, kitchen and barracks.

[9] (3) To the continuing need for maintaining detachments on outlying islands and for detailing men to various and sundry other outside assignments in the Department.

(9) To the prevailing need in Hawaii to specialize in centralized athletics.

(10) To the present need for absorbing 700 recruits, assigned without a proportionate increase in grades and ratings, who require preliminary recruit and technical school training.

(11) To the continuing need, in consequence, for detailing trained specialists from the Service Department and Tactical Squadrons to guard, police, drill, and for other post special duties which are required to maintain a command that comprises approximately 25 squadrons and over 100 separate specialized divisions, departments, and sections.

(12) To the culminating cause and effect which has resulted in the growth over several years time of a seriously under-organized form of security and an over-complicated administration of it.

#### 4. Special Findings:

a. Reference the common justice of the uniformly accepted Army axiom to the effect that every basic [10] unit such as the Air-Squadron must mediate legal jurisdiction—this to include each man's intelligence, physical, trade, experience and "trait" data and must possess a daily knowledge of the whereabouts of each man. The undersigned finds that the following complications exist under the present setup.

(1) Five or more different applications of the war Department's prescribed standardization of statistical control in personnel administration centers exist in the Department.

1st—At Schofield, on regiment centralized separate company personnel units in regimental headquarters.

2nd—Another regiment centralized composite battalion units in regimental headquarters.

3rd—Another regiment centralized the separate specialized function that are common to all companies in regimental headquarters.

The only duplication is in the clerical course. This duplication is considered necessary in view of the large number of additional clerks required by the expansion.

The requirements for furnishing men for ground defense and security measures has been responsible for this dislocation more than any other factor.

It is believed this condition could be and should be corrected by the establishment of organization messes in mobilization type buildings.

The detachment of any A. C. personnel for other than A. C. duties is objectionable and will reflect on the efficiency of the Air Force.

Concur.

Concur.

Concur.

Concur.

Concur.

Absolute uniformity is not regarded as essential.

Infantry instruction in the School of the Soldier is centralized in the Recruit Casual Camps.

A central mess conceived in the interests of economy has, to my knowledge, always been destruction of morale. Separate messes would remove this source of dissatisfaction but the established general mess cannot now be changed. It is a continuing menace to moral the affects of which can be ameliorated by most careful supervision.

Participation in centralized athletics has a decided value as a moral builder and development of "Esprit de Corps" Mass athletics should be encouraged for the development of healthy bodies and minds of the command as a whole.

## Comments on Burwell Report—Continued

Burwell's Report	Staff comments	General Martin's comments
4th—Wheeler Field centralizes its separate squadron units in the Wing Headquarters.		
5th—Hickam Field centralizes its separate squadron units in three Group Headquarters (i. e., 17th Air Base Group and the 5th and 11th Bombardment Groups) to which other separate squadron units of the Wing are attached.		
(2) Group Headquarters maintains the squadron service records, payrolls, reports of changes, etc.	No comment.	
[11] (3) Squadron Headquarters maintains the duty rosters, morning and sick reports, laundry and collection sheets, etc.	No comment.	
(4) Group and Squadron systems are different in detail to various degrees.	No comment.	
(5) Under conditions noted in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, it is impractical for all men who are detached daily on special duty to attend squadron roll calls at reveille, meal hours and retreat.	Concur.	
(6) The control of absentees and a knowledge of the whereabouts during the night and working day of large numbers of men devolves mainly upon the various noncommissioned officers or enlisted clerks in charge of numerous offices, who endeavor to keep track of daily changes in rosters and who report to Squadron Headquarters when and if absences in attendance occur. Squadron Headquarters reports daily to Group Headquarters such changes with which they have knowledge. Group Headquarters makes required reports direct to Department or to Wing Headquarters. Wing Headquarters makes required reports direct to Department Headquarters and to the Hawaiian Air Force Headquarters but in the interim of two, three or more days consumed between the reports en route from the Squadron to the Department or from the Department to the Squadron, it is found that the Air Force, Wing, or Group Headquarters have, in the meantime, issued special orders which require daily squadron action. In all such events, the Wing calls upon the Base Group and Tactical Groups. The Group calls on the Squadrons, which in turn calls back upon the various base departments for the changes or [12] exchanges of men required to comply with whatever the daily emergency dictates.	Concur. Under the present organization there will always be this conflict between daily emergencies and the training and control of the tactical units.	The solution of this problem lies with the respective squadron commanders. Squadrons must maintain a positive record by name of all men on each detail, regular or special, those on sick report or absent for any cause. Record of changes in status of this personnel is a function of the Personnel Section for the Squadron.
(7) Due to the fact that one of the numerous base departments may receive varying details from various squadrons, while one of numerous squadrons may detail men to various departments, it is obvious that close daily control obtained from close daily coordination between intelligence and personnel is physically dissembled through the existing channels of communication. Daily management is thereby prevented rather than preempted by the system itself.	Concur.	
(8) This vital defect in the daily timing of coordination throughout all intermediate echelons between the squadron and the Department is further complicated by the insertion of Army District Commanders and Naval Commanders in the channels of communications which govern the relations of S-2 intelligence functions with S-3 operations, S-4 supply, and S-1 personnel functions.	Concur.	
(9) Due also to the fact that the tactical and service squadrons are not relatively self-contained units, similar to infantry companies, it is found that the chain of personnel-control and the chain of intelligence-control must be coordinated, regularly and systematically in the lower echelons in order to insure daily security.	Concur.	
(10) In further consideration of conditions set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 above, combined with the further fact that the intelligence and front-line capabilities of the squadrons are further adversely affected by the separate variation in the [13] timing of the	This paragraph is apparently an introduction to paragraph 11.	



mass of personnel, operations, material, flight and command communications flowing daily between the Department to the Squadron and the Squadron to the Department, the undersigned finds that a standard system of systematic daily coordination throughout all echelons in both Wings of the Hawaiian Air Force is now a necessity.

(11) That the excessive complications of the present set-up may be simplified by grouping the agencies, functions, and sub-centers of coordination, uniformly and commonly alike into five standard divisions throughout all echelons of command. For this purpose, authority should be granted to rearrange existing tentative Base Group tables of organization into a more natural operative form using the proposed "maintenance service command" and "operations control office" and "ground security troops" as a basis.

(12) That principal activities, main delays, untoward legal incidents, and important cooperative contacts should be reported upward daily from the Squadron by each of the five standard divisions to all command echelons in the Air Force for successive staff coordination of daily difficulties over which the lower echelons have no direct control.

#### 5. Detailed Findings:

a. In the spirit of cooperation the following detailed findings in a large part were prepared jointly by the undersigned and Headquarters of the Commanding General, 18th Wing, who has initiated action or prepared a plan of action and with whom this report has been previously coordinated in conjunction with the Inspector General's report.

##### [14] b. Command Divisions:

(1) That a complete list of all prepared plans and recommendations of the Commanding General, 18th Wing, be brought to the personal attention of the Department Commander to insure a formal decision in respect to required priorities and time limits prescribed by the Department for the guidance and compliance of the Department Engineer.

(2) That the status and condition of Hickam Field be treated as one necessitating a formal regard for the serious legal consequences involved.

(3) That intelligence functions be assigned to the five functional divisions of the Wing; to wit (1) command intelligence, (2) personnel intelligence, (3) operations intelligence, (4) materiel intelligence and (5) flight intelligence.

(4) That the Chief of the Wing Inspection Department be furnished a list of critical items mentioned hereinafter for collaboration, inspection and report.

(5) That a Chief of a Wing Plans and Intelligence Section be organized as a fifth section of the staff and work similar to the Inspection Department, under the direct control of the Wing Commander.

(6) That the Chief Executive of the Wing exercise a more exclusive and separate sense of control over his associate executives who are charged especially with the responsibility for coordination of the agencies in personnel, operations, and materiel divisions.

(7) That a special investigation, comment and recommendations be directed to determine the underlying causes for the reported discontent and lowered morale of the junior officer and private soldier; this in order to separate the effects of self-inflicted disaffection from the effects of possible subversive agents.

##### c. Personnel Division:

This paragraph implies a fundamental change in the military establishment which should only be considered after a more thorough and exacting study has been made of the ramifications of such reorganization.

It is not believed that a system involving formal daily reports is required. As stated above, any basic change in the theory of staff organization requires further study.

No comments.

It is believed that the question of priorities is being handled in a manner as satisfactory as can be expected under existing conditions.

It is being so regarded.

The subdivision of the entire military function into the 5 classifications noted is a subject requiring further study.

It is not believed that the combining of administration and technical inspections into a single agency would serve a useful purpose. As to each of the present inspection branches the statement under discussion substantially describes existing procedure.

The recommendation that Plans & Intelligence be combined is not concurred in. A Wing, when it constitutes a component part of [15] a larger unit, is not regarded as a planning echelon.

The necessity for close staff coordination requires no comment.

It is the unanimous opinion of the staff officers working on this report that the morale condition at Hickam Field is unsatisfactory.

Burwell's Report	Staff comments	General Martin's comments
(1) That the personnel administration centers be standardized within the Hawaiian Air Force.	Inasmuch as these units are practically standardized now and will be completely standardized in the near future, this recommendation is taken care of. Concur.	
(2) That the interior watchmen, guard and security functions at Hickam Field be organized with separate grades and ratings into an organic detachment similar to the set-up in effect in the Navy at Pearl Harbor, the Hawaiian Division at Schofield and the Hawaiian Headquarters at Fort Shafter.		
[16] (3) That the general consolidated mess be similarly organized into a semi-permanent department with direct control of its separate officers, men, grades and ratings, similar to the practice in the Navy.	As previously stated it is recommended that the consolidated mess be discontinued as soon as practicable.	Under existing circumstances it is physically impossible to organize separate messes in the existing building. The consolidated mess is now operating as a general mess in accordance with existing Army Regulations.
(4) That the additional equipment and installations urgently needed by the general mess be expedited in every way possible to prevent the reoccurrence of the recent epidemic of stomach disorder.	Equipment has been or is being purchased and improvements are now under way. Concur.	
(5) That all serious illegalities committed by enlisted men be coordinated with the Flight Surgeon for a physiological "trait" analysis and report to S-2.	Concur.	
(6) That a special morale report be required as to the status of the swimming pool, gymnasium, motion picture theatre, and low cost housing program with estimated dates of completion.		
(7) That an Assistant S-1 be assigned as Director of Morale, Recreation and Athletics, similar to the position created in the Hawaiian Division, and that he give special attention to such items as the acquisition of six additional tennis courts and the maintenance of the six courts now in use, etc.	This has been done.	
(8) That daily Squadron Work Sheets showing the actual daily physical location of assigned men be prepared daily by all Squadrons.	All concur except G-2. G-2 thinks it is entirely useless and invariably inaccurate paper work.	Concur. This can be accomplished by making separate lists containing names of men on specific details. These lists to be prepared from a complete roster of men in the organization.
[17] (9) That centralized recruit training and centralized technical school courses be set-up as a separate organic department and made to function as a personnel replacement center directly under the control of Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force similar in general purpose to the Hawaiian Air Depot which acts as a Materiel Replacement Center.	Concur. Recruit training is now centralized at Bellows but it is considered impracticable to combine the technical schools with that organization due to lack of suitable housing and buildings. It is further believed that replacements for Hawaii as well as all foreign stations should be graduates of technical schools on the mainland. Concur.	
(10) That a minimum number of men, grades and ratings, be set-up for each service division, department and section of the Base which constitutes the relatively constant permanent overhead of the station whether or not one, two or more Groups are assigned thereto.		



(11) That a standard system of control governing the promotion of all men within the ratios of grades and ratings prescribed for the command, service and combat divisions, be based predominantly upon the efficiency report and the recommendation of the operating departments.

[18] (12) That a complete list of day and night shifts for all types of tours of duty be prepared to counteract the inaccurate impression created in the Department by seeing numerous unemployed "off duty" men about the station.

(13) That the remaining men only be made available for guard and security in the form of a separate organic department composed preferably of infantrymen.

(14) That the informal recommendations of the Infantry Liaison Officer, Hickam Field, be submitted formally and that his recommendation for the type and number of men and weapons required be favorably considered; also, that officers assigned to ground defense and security wear side-arms.

[19] (15) That the guard at the main gate be equipped with accessories necessary to operate a recording machine that will automatically check the license number of all cars entering and leaving the post.

(16) That enlisted guards be requested to avoid carrying on extended conversation with strangers or from being diverted by people of either sex when on duty.

(17) That men employed on the line and in the engineering shops be furnished distinctive arm bands, or straps, or caps, or other means of controlling any unnecessary inter-flow of personnel within the station.

(18) That special instructions in writing be furnished the guard and patrols to check all parking plans in order to insure as far as possible that no unauthorized car with hidden personnel or materiel is permitted to remain overnight on the station.

(19) That in the absence of daytime guards, the Chief Clerk of Principal Departments be issued pistols.

(20) That S-1 maintain a list and check on all enlisted men who may be taking civilian flying instructions.

(21) That the Fire Department be instructed in writing to judge carefully the question of not employing all equipment at any one time on brush, cane or small fires at a distance beyond recall.

[20] (22) That the question of any heavy indebtedness of young officers for autos and uniforms be re-checked.

(23) That cases of heavy indebtedness of enlisted men at the Post Exchange and Non-commissioned Officers' Club be re-checked.

(24) That enlisted men and civilian employees with bad police records be returned to the mainland.

(25) That the vital question of food and water poisoning receive increasing daily attention and that the question of alien servants be rechecked.

A standard promotion system is now under study in this Headquarters for the Hawaiian Air Force. It is believed that representation should be made to the Chief of the Army Air Forces looking to an established system throughout.

It is fully recognized that a large number of activities have to function at night. It is not believed that this condition has created any erroneous impression.

The tables of organization provide an entirely inadequate force for security and guard. It is strongly recommended that a form of security organization which is capable of providing close-in defense against all forms of attack should be an integral part of all A. C. stations. G-2 concurs except the word units should be substituted for stations.

Recommendations of Infantry Liaison Officer should be considered on their merits when they are submitted.

Recommend this or some other similar system be adopted.

This is covered in the General Orders of all guards.

Concur.

Concur.

Guards should be present at all times on critical points. \*

Concur.

Concur.

This is being investigated.

Concur.

Concur.

The character of the local population makes this an extremely difficult question to deal with and we believe that the seriousness can not be over emphasized.

Concur in Staff Comments. The security organization be authorized for each station to meet the requirements of that station. This means that there can be no uniformity as to strength and grades and ratings for this organization. A security detachment within units could not properly serve this purpose.

They are not supposed to be enlisted with such a record.

Burwell's Report	Staff comments	General Martin's comments
<p>(26) That a special study and report be made of the specific causes for dissatisfaction with the pay and promotion of enlisted guard and of the distribution of air mechanics and flying pay to enlisted men.</p> <p>(27) That the wide variation between Squadrons in the internal distribution of pay, including air mechanics pay, flying pay, pay for grades and ratings, and special pay (exclusive of per diem allowances) be made the subject of a special study and report with the view of creating a more uniform control of the minimum amounts that should be assigned to vital specialties such as squadron mess, communications, armament, maintenance, without [21] adversely affecting the basic combat crew's need for first priority of flying pay.</p> <p>(28) That S-1 offices, officers and functions be separated organically from that of the Adjutant General's office throughout all echelons.</p> <p>(29) That consideration be given to extending the excellent practice of the travelling nurse in the Depot to married noncommissioned officers and civilian employee families of Hickam Field.</p> <p><i>d. Operations Division:</i></p> <p>(1) That all photographic mosaics of Hickam Field and the island of Oahu be re-checked now and numbered.</p> <p>(2) That all plats of communication systems and terminals be checked and numbered.</p> <p>(3) That a technical Signal expert be required to re-check the proposed use of communications personnel set-up in the various alert, security and defense plan to prevent conflict.</p> <p>(4) That field orders which prescribe various degrees of readiness be re-checked in connection with plans for Ground Security, alert plans and plan for the Evacuation of Civilians, in order to prevent conflict in the successive or concurrent execution of such plans and orders.</p> <p>[22] (5) That no intermediate supervisor of heavy bombardment training be interposed, for an extended period, between Wing Headquarters and the Commanding Officers of either tactical group, contrary to the due rights and process vested in duly constituted commanders who are legally responsible in the event of riot, disorder, aircraft fatalities and for the safety and security of their command pursuant to the orders of duly constituted higher commanders.</p> <p>(6) That the action required by the Wing Plan to increase the lighting of critical areas along the hangar-line, dead-line, and under parked aircraft be expedited.</p> <p>(7) That instructions governing the supervision of the amateur radio operators be reduced to writing.</p> <p>(8) That special instructions governing the supervision of chemicals, ordnance and armament, to include heavy demolitions that lie in the open at outlying fields and for the safeguarding of bombsights on over-night stops be reviewed in the light of emergency conditions.</p> <p>(9) That the storage and shortage of water and exposed pipelines at outlying fields be considered critical from an operating standpoint as well as a ground security viewpoint.</p>	<p>This and the following paragraph discuss conditions common to the Air Corps at large and should be studied from the viewpoint of the Air Corps at large.</p> <p>Concur. They should be separated down to and including the wing.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>This is being done.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Concur. It is also to be noted that "Standing Operating Procedure" is now being revised.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>This project is now under-way.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>This condition is under continuous review. No provision is being made for storage of bombsights at outlying fields. Bombsights are under constant guard when the airplane crew is absent.</p> <p>It is believed that the responsible commanders concerned are fully aware of the critical situation in regards to water supply.</p>	<p>Concur.</p>



[23] (10) That the custody of keys to all small arms be reviewed and reduced to writing to include the names of individuals possessing keys to racks and vaults.

(11) That security measures to prevent tapping of telephone wires between Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields be reduced to writing and frequent practice.

(12) That the question of developing an auxiliary mobile message center in an air transport equipped especially with a receiving and sending set, wire and repair men, be considered.

(13) That the recommendations of the Hawaiian Air Force Signal Officer in reference to safe-guarding of critical radio and telephone terminals be re-submitted and receive favorable action.

(14) That additional measures, such as a voice code, be prescribed and tested to insure the authenticity of parties who transmit telephone messages and the private soldiers be excluded from the duty of transmitting important verbal orders of serious purport.

*e. Materiel Division:*

(1) That the present inspection of the aqua system to include periodic chemical analysis of oil as well as gas, be revised and prescribed in [24] writing as a part of an intelligence pamphlet and that it include further safe-guards against the danger of leaking containers in buildings and the pollution of lubricating oil in critical pieces of heavy machinery. Also, that the cooperation and technical advice, in this respect, of the shop superintendent, Hawaiian Air Depot, be solicited.

(2) That the openings under the platform of the Hickam Field dock at the head of the aqua system be further secured by some form of a gate that will prevent any unauthorized small boats from planting explosives under the dock.

(3) That additional protective security measures to safe-guard all man-holes and terminals for water, light, power, sewage, compressed air and communications be requested of the District Engineer as a separate project.

(4) That a list be obtained from all Squadron Engineers and prepared by Wing S-4 of all items on B-17 type aircraft that are considered to be "critical", such as the electrical fuel pumps, the apertures under the main wings in which small explosives may be hidden, the main control cables, the connection of control cables with the servo drums of the automatic pilot, the heavy lead counter-weight in the tail of the fuselage, slits or punctures in the rubber tires, etc.

[25] (5) That the daily inspections required by Form 41, Standard Air Corps Maintenance and Inspection System, be increased by local orders to include such a selected list of "critical" items.

(6) That a time limit or priority for the completion of work required of the Engineer Corps in the Wing plan for screening, lighting and fencing of Hickam Field be prescribed particularly by special order.

(7) That second line of maintenance in the Base Engineering Shop be rendered more self-contained and independent of third line of maintenance in the Depot, in order that Hickam Field may carry-on if and when the Depot is incapacitated; also that the additional power lines for the Base Engineering Shops, for which funds, it is understood, have been available to the Engineers for several months, be put on a prescribed priority list by the Department.

(8) That rotation of technical workers assigned to the shops be sharply reduced, in order to prevent one link or another in the chain of shop management from breaking the completion of daily work orders.

Concur.

It is considered that the possibility of tapping exposed wires is an ever-present danger.

Concur.

The Air Force Signal Officer will be called upon to re-submit any recommendations he may have made and they will be given such consideration as they deserve.

Concur.

It is believed that this should be covered by instructions to the guard supplemented by such standing orders that will insure periodic inspections by the department head concerned.

Concur.

This project is underway.

Concur.

Concur.

This project is under way and appropriations have been made for the accomplishment of same.

Concur.

Concur.

This is being cared for by the temporary organization, Maintenance Command.

This paragraph is not understood. It seems to be contradictory. A certain amount of rotation of technical workers is desired that they may acquire knowledge which will permit flexibility in assignment. Such flexibility should operate to prevent interruptions in completion of work orders.

## Comments on Burwell Report—Continued

Burwell's Report	Staff comments	General Martin's comments
<p>(9) That the Base Supply Department receive the same corrective consideration as the [26] Base Engineering Department for the same reasons.</p> <p>(10) That the space occupied by the Engineer lumber piles that were stacked at the end of the runway, previous to the special inspection of the Depot, be further cleared of lumber and scrub growth to allow an unobstructed night approach to the diagonal runway and that this area be smoothly leveled to allow an inadvertent landing short of the runway as well as to prevent a concealed approach to the paint and oil section of the Depot.</p> <p>(11) That all plats and diagrams of electrical, water, sewage and gasoline systems be re-checked and numbered.</p> <p>(12) That copies of the detailed findings of Hawaiian Air Depot and Hickam Field and post orders and regulations in the premise be furnished the District Engineer Detachment at Hickam Field with request that a copy of report of action taken be furnished.</p> <p>(13) That additional measures for nighttime security be prescribed to prevent the unauthorized use of gas trucks or other similar civilian or military vehicles that might be employed by a subversive operator to spread a large amount of leaking gasoline over critical areas around the shops, hangars and dead-line.</p> <p>(14) That the status of all civilian foremen of the Quartermaster, supply, fire department, etc. who control nearly all utilities [27] that can tie up the operation of a military city be re-checked with a view of giving them increased personal consideration and privileges designed to enhance social morale.</p> <p>(15) That the execution of plans for increasing the number and length of runways on Hickam Field and the island of Oahu be expedited.</p> <p><i>f. Flight Division:</i></p> <p>(1) That flight and airplane commanders especially of B-17 type of bombardment aircraft be formally delegated the legal responsibility of a commander in a sense similar to that delegated to Train Commanders in Army Regulations.</p> <p>(2) That each airplane commander be held directly and legally responsible for the intelligence functions of his combat crew in flight.</p> <p>(3) That each airplane commander be also held directly and legally responsible for the related function of his flight plan, the coordination of flight communications, and the supervision of pre-flight inspection, loading, dress, discipline and tactical reports.</p> <p><i>6. Conclusions:</i></p> <p><i>a.</i> That the measurable degree of sinking morale is due to a feeling of instability, bias or lack of confidence in the general set-up, not to the effects of subversive activities [28] within the command; although such a condition naturally provides a more fertile breeding grounds for hostile proclivities.</p>	<p>Concur. Concur. Concur.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Not concurred in. Considered unnecessary.</p> <p>Concur.</p> <p>Recommend that personnel concerned be interviewed or otherwise questioned to determine whether or not any dissatisfaction exists with a view to correction thereof. Concur.</p> <p>It is considered that this is now in effect but that the allusion to a train commander is hardly pertinent.</p> <p>This is in effect.</p> <p>This is in effect.</p> <p>Morale is satisfactory but it is agreed that morale is questionable however it is felt that it is occasioned by the lack of proper recreational and athletic facilities coupled with numerous small irritating regulations and restrictions which in themselves seem minor but accumulate to a point which defeats their intended purposes. Other contributing factors are the present method of promotion, exten-</p>	<p>Existing regulations from the War Department make the pilot of army airplanes fully responsible for handling and safe-guarding his airplane at all times while in his control.</p>



b. That a standard outline of organization and system of coordination is required for the [20] Air Force, to include a prompt revision of tables of organization for the Air Base Group.

c. That a list of priorities covering all pending projects of Hickam Field be approved and directed by the Department for the guidance of the Department Engineers, and that a monthly "degree of completion report" be furnished to insure compliance within prescribed time limits.

7. *Recommendations:*

That the Department Commander authorize a board of general officers of the Hawaiian Air Force to constitute the uniform standards of organization and standard system of coordination required by present conditions and the existing emergency.

8. *Appreciation:*

a. Appreciation is expressed for the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and of Mr. Shivers Federal Bureau of Investigation.

b. The cooperation of Lieutenant Colonel James A. Mollison, Chief of Staff, of Lieutenant Colonel Parker Tenney, Inspector General of Hawaiian Air Force, and Major A. W. Meehan, G-3 is acknowledged.

c. The spirit of open honest helpfulness [30] displayed by Brigadier General J. H. Rudolph, regardless of his own immediate duty for administering the necessary changes from a peace-time status to a critical border-line war-time condition, is considered worthy of commendation.

d. Reference paragraph 5, subparagraph a above, it is appreciated that the present status is the product of several years growth therefore only a collective sense of responsibility is at issue.

e. For above reason, a copy of this report has been furnished the Commanding General, 18th Wing, with a request that he register any difference of facts or opinion and attach thereto a copy of his prepared plans or actions that have already been initiated by his headquarters.

sion from two to three year tour of service for enlisted men, and the consolidated mess. It is believed that immediate steps should be taken to provide any or all of the following recreational and cultural facilities; bowling alleys, soft-ball diamonds, swimming pools, theatres, boxing and wrestling arenas, football, amateur theatricals, paid vaudeville acts, vocational and academic schools (night), tennis courts, outdoor handball courts, skating rinks, libraries, and service clubs. Any or all of these to be under the supervision of officer personnel particularly qualified in these activities.

The organization for units of the H. A. F. is now standard. It is agreed there is room for improvements in the organization of Air Base Units.

It is presumed that the Department Commander requires such reports and records as he considers necessary.

No comment.

H. S. BURWELL, Colonel, A. C.,  
Special Inspector.

(AG-1)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,  
OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER,  
Hickam Field, T. H., 17 November 1941.

In reply refer to:

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. In compliance with instructions contained in letter AG 383.4/6, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 1 May 1941, subject: "Provisions for Security of Installations", there are inclosed special reports on Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and the Hawaiian Air Depot.

2. These reports have been carefully studied by this headquarters and those deficiencies susceptible of correction have been corrected. Many of the opinions expressed by the inspecting officer are in conflict with established policies and Army organization and as such cannot receive remedial action by local commanders.

3. The vital installations on all Air Force stations are believed to be adequately guarded and all commanders are fully cognizant of their responsibilities.

F. L. Martin,

F. L. MARTIN,

Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

3 Incls.

#1—Report on Hickam Field

#2—Report on Wheeler Field

#3—Report on Hawaiian Air Depot

HEADQUARTERS 14TH PURSUIT WING,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL,  
Wheeler Field, T. H., 29 July 1941.

Refer to:

Subject: Special Report On Wheeler Field, T. H.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.

1. *Authority:*

a. See paragraph 1, attached copy of Special Report on Hickam Field, Hawaiian Air Force, 9 July 1941.

2. *Estimate of the Situation:*

a. See attached report, paragraph 2 a, b, c, and d.

(Due to the recent freezing of Japanese credits, it is estimated that security measures for pursuit aviation have increased in importance to the extent that Wheeler Field, as an Advanced Depot, should now be prepared to take up the shock in case the Hawaiian Air Depot is incapacitated.)

3. *General Findings:*

a. See attached report, paragraph 3 a, b, c, also copy of memorandum to Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, 10 July 1941.

(Reference the verbal authority of the Department Commander to create and test an experimental maintenance command in the Hawaiian Air Force, it is believed that the uniform and common grouping of responsibilities now in effect at Wheeler Field may be used as a guide in stabilizing the control of personnel.)

4. *Special Findings:*

a. See attached report, paragraph 4 a (1).

(Wheeler Field has centralized all squadron units in a Wing Headquarters Personnel Administration Center. Investigation indicates that this set-up may be well employed as a standard.)

5. *Detailed Findings:*

a. The following detailed findings contained in attached report apply constructively to the 14th Wing: Paragraph 5 a, paragraph 5 b (1), (2), and (3), paragraph 5 c (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (29); paragraph 5 d (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14); paragraph 5 e (1), (3), (4) (re P-40s), (5), (12), (13), (14); paragraph 5 f (1), (2), and (3).

(In order to instill an adequate attitude of mind throughout the lower echelons of the command on the subject of intelligence, the undersigned finds that all squadron intelligence officers need an intelligence manual composed of specific details



such as those contained in paragraph 5, attached report. The Commanding General and Staff of the 14th Pursuit Wing fully appreciate the desire of the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department and Hawaiian Air Force to effect, quickly, a change from the previous peace-time status to the present borderline war-time status, and have fully cooperated by preparing a detailed plan of action.)

(Special attention is invited to the need for continued and increasing daily coordination between the Corps of Engineers at Schofield Barracks and Wheeler Field.)

(It is believed that there is an urgent security need for "satellite" fields adjacent to or in the near vicinity of Wheeler Field.)

**6. Conclusions:**

a. See attached report, paragraph 6 b, c.

(Special attention is invited to the need for an organic maintenance command.)

(Special attention is invited to the needs of Wheeler Field for priority consideration and early action on the recommendations of the Commanding General, 14th Wing, in reference to fencing, lighting, facilities at Wright Gate, further military control of the public highway through Wheeler Field, and to required safeguarding of all paint, oil, and gas dumps.

**7. Recommendations:**

a. See attached report, paragraph 7 a.

**8. Appreciation:**

a. See attached report, paragraph 8 a, b, d, e.

(The spirit of helpfulness extended by the Commanding General and Staff, 14th Wing, to the undersigned, in the preparation of the required changes from a peace-time status to a critical borderline condition, is considered worthy of commendation.)

b. A copy of this report has been furnished the Commanding General, 14th Wing, with a request that he register his concurrence or his difference of opinion, and attach thereto a copy of his prepared plans or actions that have already been initiated by his headquarters.

H. S. Burwell,

H. S. BURWELL,

*Colonel, Air Corps, Special Inspector.*

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CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 15 July 1941.*

In reply refer to:

AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Major General Frederick L. Martin, U. S. A., Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.

With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941, request information as to when a reply may be expected.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

O. M. McDole,

*Major, A. G. D.,*

*Assistant Adjutant General.*

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,  
OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 June 1941.*

In reply refer to:

Subject: Special Report.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Pursuant to instructions contained in attached War Department letter the following special report on the Hawaiian Air Depot is submitted:

**1. General Comments:**

a. Officers of the G-2 Section, Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force and of the F. B. I. were previously interviewed reference general policy.

b. All commissioned officers and foremen of the Depot were personally interviewed reference their knowledge and familiarity with the names, faces, and reputation of all employees.

c. Headquarters personnel records are inspected for upkeep and statistical data. All warehouses, storerooms, shops and grounds were inspected personally.

d. Critical locations were examined carefully.

2. Judged by standards required in peace time, conditions were found as follows:

a. *Airplanes:*

- (1) Officers, superior.
- (2) Crews, competent and trustworthy.
- (3) Planes, excellent condition, locked at night, spot lighted.
- (4) Guards, trustworthy.
- (5) History of aircraft evidenced in Form #41 reveals no evidence of previous untoward instances.
- (6) Technical inspections, complete.
- (7) No cases of carelessness noted.

b. *Buildings and Grounds:*

- (1) Offices, superior.
- (2) Chief clerk and superintendent, especially intelligent.
- (3) Foremen, competent and trustworthy.
- (4) Technicians, skilled and conscientious.
- (5) Workers, industrious.
- (6) Shop inspection, thorough.
- (7) Equipment, good condition.
- (8) Buildings, carefully locked at night.
- (9) Guards, trustworthy.
- (10) Machinery, clean.
- (11) Supplies, stored orderly.
- (12) Fire apparatus, good condition.
- (13) No cases of carelessness noted.

c. *Related Factors:*

Badges are being worn. Action being initiated on photo badges. Employees are being check in and out at the main gate. Foremen and workers wear separate, distinctive uniforms. The Depot Commander, the Supply Officer and Chief Engineer, Lieutenant Colonels Hurd, Montgomery and Lewis, respectively, are giving intelligent and commendable attention to local responsibilities concerned on the subject of this survey.

2. *Conclusions:*

Based on standards required in time of an unlimited emergency:

a. That the general opinion of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department and the Hawaiian Air Force, to the effect that the requirements prescribed for guards at the gate, the interior watchman system and the inspection of identification badges, should be progressively increased during the present unlimited emergency and that this conclusion is appreciated by subordinate officers in the Depot who are initiating a plan of action to effect a compliance.

b. That progressive and increasing attention be given by every foreman to insure a more intimate knowledge of every employee's name, face and characteristics and to this end that his intelligence test, physical test, trade test, experience test and, most importantly, his "trait" test data be systematically compiled and maintained.

c. That the vital G-2 aspects of the above test-data be increasingly coordinated with the S-1 office.

d. That the present degree of cooperation between the Depot and the Civil Service, also between the Depot and the F. B. I. are considered to be excellent.

e. That existing conflicts between the communications plan of organization and operation as contained in the Hawaiian Air Force Field Orders and prescribed degrees of readiness in the security, alert and local defense plans be made the subject of a special survey by a Signal specialist or a technical communications expert, in order to insure a coordinated execution of the plan.

f. That all anti-sabotage plans carefully separate requirements that are actually on hand and issued, from plans which deal with future or projected needs; or, in other words, that anti-sabotage plans emphasize the need for an organization "in being" with material "on hand" for instant utility at any time.

g. That increasingly systematic inspection of the aqua system throughout, to include a chemical analysis of both gas and oil, be further intensified.



*h.* That, during the period of the present unlimited emergency, all employees be further indoctrinated with a semi-military spirit of morale and discipline and to this end that further stress upon social gatherings, restaurant facilities, personal medical attention, and picnics be encouraged. Also that periodical and orderly assemblies such as roll calls, fire calls, etc., be further encouraged.

*i.* That critical attention be given to selecting critical items.

(1) The electrical fuel pumps on the B-17's may be considered as a critical item.

(2) The aqua system and the fire hazard incident to the storage or leakage of gas and oil in the warehouses and storerooms may be considered as critical items in the supply department.

(3) The power, compressed air, water, and sewage lines or connections may be considered as critical items in the engineering shops; also the pollution of lubricating machine oil be considered as critical.

(4) The main highway through the Depot, the isolated engine test stands, the engineer lumber dumps adjacent to the runway and food in the restaurant be considered as critical items in general.

#### 6. Recommendations:

*a.* That a regularly assigned Depot S-2 and Intelligence Plans Officer be appointed.

*b.* That a Depot Inspector and an Intelligence Plans Officer be appointed and directed to prepare a combined inspection, security, alert and defense plan for the Depot and that two administrative reserve officers be assigned to the Depot.

*c.* That a travelling nurse, qualified as a psychologist, be assigned to the Depot and be authorized to attend employees' families.

*d.* That the lumber stacked at the end of the main runway be removed on the grounds that it constitutes a flying hazard and furnishes a close-up screen to the edge of the Depot as well as a concealed position from which a saboteur without detection could easily shoot up and hit a plane during its glide, especially at night.

*e.* That the interior watchman and guard system be increased progressively from the present strength of 21 men to a strength of 42 men and that patrols be instructed to work in units of two men or to keep in regular and frequent contact with each other.

*f.* That employees in the various shops and warehouses of the new buildings, when completed, be furnished distinctive arm bands, or colored shoulder straps, or caps, to aid in controlling any unnecessary inter-flow of personnel between separate buildings and between separate sections within buildings.

*g.* That priority of screening, as recommended by the Depot, be approved and that this priority be considered as urgent, especially as it refers to the screening of the motor test stand and a high man-proof screen required between the main depot road and the depot warehouse that contains highly inflammable stores such as gas, oil and chemicals.

*h.* That written instructions be issued to the guard verifying the present parking plan and verbal orders reference the daily inspection of all cars entering and leaving the Depot, this to insure that no unauthorized personnel or material is hidden in the back of cars, and also to insure that no unauthorized personnel remain hidden overnight in the shops.

*i.* That the subject of locks and keys which may have been in use for a long time be made the subject of a special survey with the purpose of requiring all locks and keys to be changed periodically, and that all men possessing keys to vital installations be listed and systematically checked.

*j.* That, in the absence of daytime guards, the civilian chief clerks, superintendents and foremen be issued pistols.

*k.* That all plats or diagrams of water, electrical, sewage and gasoline systems be checked and numbered.

*l.* That the Depot Commander maintain a list of all employees who may be taking civilian flying instruction.

*m.* That a confidential general directive be issued by the Hawaiian Air Force to subordinate commanders to the effect that higher authority reposes special trust and confidence in their employees; that the present "unlimited emergency" requires a quick appreciation of the difference between "peace" and "emergency" conditions; that hostile saboteurs prepare most ingenious plans of fire and destruction and effect them with bold and ruthless determination; that our previous habitual sense of peace and security must be realistically tempered; that local commanders are directly responsible for the preparation and super-

vision of internal security plans which now should be based on the premise that at least a hundred saboteurs might act by criminal intention and stealth at any time, at any hour, even today or tonight; that no matter how far-fetched such a basic premise may seem in peace time or how much it may stretch peace-time credulity, that nevertheless the command responsibility for intelligence requires such a day by day sense of prevention.

H. S. Burwell,  
H. S. BURWELL,  
Colonel, A. C., Special Inspector.

1 Incl.

Ltr. TAG, 3/26/41  
"Provisions for Security  
of Installations"

1st Ind.

(A-1)

Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H., 4 June 1941.  
To: Commanding Officer, Hawaiian Air Depot, Hickam Field, T. H.

1. For careful consideration and recommendation on putting into being each item of paragraph 6 of this report.

2. Paragraph 6 h. to be interpreted that parked cars of employees be maintained under constant surveillance that nothing detrimental to security be removed therefrom or placed therein while these cars are in their parking areas.

By command of Major General MARTIN:

Cheney L. Bertholf,  
CHENEY L. BERTHOLF,  
Lt. Col., A. G. D.,  
Adjutant General.

1 Incl. n/c

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CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 May 1941.

In reply refer to:

AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Major General Fulton Q. C. Gardner, U. S. A., Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, Fort De Russy, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941 on the above subject.

2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect your installations to see if they are adequately guarded.

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

Carl Grosse,  
CARL GROSSE,  
Major, A. G. D.,  
Assistant Adjutant General.

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CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington, March 26, 1941.

AG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M.

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: The Commanding Generals, All Armies, GHQ Air Force, Departments, Corps Areas, and Air Forces; Chief of the Air Corps; Chief of Ordnance; and The Quartermaster General.

1. The possibility of widespread simultaneous, as well as isolated and spasmodic, attempts at sabotage of military supplies and equipment is increasing daily. The multiplication of new stations, and the growing number of airplanes and pieces of motor equipment, make the difficulty of guarding against such dangers more acute.



2. The most vigorous efforts will be made by all commanders to provide adequate security for installations and equipment for which they are responsible.

3. Security will be greatly enhanced where vital areas can be fenced and lighted, but in the absence of such construction adequate interior guards must be maintained. The effective functioning of counter-subversive measures pursuant to instructions from Department or Corps Area Commanders will materially aid in the accomplishment of security.

4. Necessary counter-subversive measures are a responsibility of command and are organized and directed under the authority of the unit commanders. Department and Corps Area Commanders are responsible for the coordination of security measures throughout their Departments and Corps Areas, including activities at exempted stations. They should be freely consulted in such matters.

By order of the Secretary of War:

S/ E. S. ADAMS,  
*Major General,  
The Adjutant General.*

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CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H. 1 May 1941.*

In reply refer to:  
AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Colonel Webster A. Capron, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter *26 March 1941* on the above subject.

2. The Commanding General desires that you make a personal inspection to see if the ammunition and Ordnance Depot is adequately guarded.

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

CARL GROSSE,  
*Major, A. G. D.,  
Assistant Adjutant General.*

(Basic: Ltr., IHD, AG 383.4/6, 1 May 1941, subject: "Provisions for Security of Installations.")

383.4

1st Ind.

HQ. H. S. C. A. BRIGADE, Ft. DeRussy, T. H., June 28, 1941.

To OG Haw. Dept.

1. As the result of a personal inspection of the installations of this command, the following comments are submitted:

a. In general the nature and the extent of these installations are such as to preclude the practicability of maintaining continuously sufficient guards to assure the protection of all such installations against determined and well organized saboteurs.

b. In my inspection special attention was devoted to the matter of the storage of directors and height finders for antiaircraft artillery batteries. Where fixed seacoast battery emplacements with protected magazines are available (at Fort Kamehameha, Fort DeRussy and Fort Ruger) these instruments are kept stored in the magazines. At Fort Weaver they are stored in one of the concrete magazines. At Fort Barrette they are stored in the protected plotting room. In the case of the 64th Coast Artillery (AA) they are stored in one of the concrete storehouses at the Hawaiian Ordnance Depot. At Camp Malakole and at Sand Island, where no protected or fireproof storage is available, they are stored in the barracks.

2. Plans recently submitted in connection with the construction required for the augmentation of the antiaircraft artillery garrison include provision for concrete storehouses for the storage of directors and height finders at Schofield Barracks, Fort Weaver, Fort Kamehameha, Fort Shafter, Fort Ruger, Fort DeRussy, Ulupau, Fort Barrette and at Camp Malakole. Recommendations will be submitted in the near future for the construction of a similar storehouse at Sand Island.

3. In general all fixed batteries and all vital installations are guarded either by sentinels or by local guards quartered at these installations.

4. It is believed that, upon the completion of the concrete store houses referred to in paragraph 2 above reasonably effective security will be provided for all important installations of this command.

Fulton Q. C. Gardner,  
FULTON Q. C. GARDNER,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

## CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 May 1941.

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Lieutenant Colonel Roland Walsh, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort Armstrong, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941 on the above subject.

2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect the warehouse area of the Quartermaster Depot to see if the warehouses and supplies are adequately guarded.

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

CARL GROSSE,  
Major, A. G. D.,  
Assistant Adjutant General.

1st Ind.

QM 383.4/6-A

Colonel Roland Walsh, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort Armstrong, T. H.,  
8 August 1941.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. I have personally inspected the warehouse area of this depot and in order to provide a greater degree of protection I have fenced the entire area with a 9 ft. cyclone fence and increased the lights in this area.

2. Return of this paper has been delayed pending a thorough study of the requirements of the guard detachment of this depot. Recommendations for an adequate guard detachment were submitted August 7, 1941. Favorable action on this request is considered imperative for the proper protection of this installation.

ROLAND WALSH,  
Colonel, Q. M. C.,  
Commanding.

## CONFIDENTIAL

## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

## INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

DOO 600.96/13



No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.	
1st Ind. DOO 5 Jul '41	AG	1. A report was presented in person by the undersigned to the Commanding General, 2 May 1941. As a result an Infantry Company has been detailed as a permanent guard for the Ammunition Storage Area. This question was reviewed by the Inspector General who concurred in my recommendations, and the actual change was effected May 9.	
		2. A project has been submitted to the Chief of Ordnance and approved, covering an interior lighting installation. Funds for the consummation of this work have been promised us shortly after the beginning of the present new fiscal year.	
		3. A detailed estimate is under preparation covering the lighting of the peripheral fence around the Crater. This project will be submitted to the proper authorities when it has been drawn up in complete detail.	
		4. It is regretted that no formal written report was submitted on this matter but it was felt that having presented the report in person to the Department Commander, and having taken prompt Radio action where indicated, no such written report was necessary.	W. A. C.

## CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 May 1941.*

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Colonel Webster A. Capron, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 19411941 on the above subject.

2. The Commanding General desires that you make a personal inspection to see if the ammunition and Ordnance Depot is adequately guarded.

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

Carl Grösse  
CARL GROSSE,  
Major, A. G. D.,  
Assistant Adjutant General.

2nd Ind.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT,  
*Hickam Field, T. H., 13 June 1941.*

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Judged by the new situation and standards required in consequence of the recently declared unlimited national emergency, it is considered that the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Inspector are necessary and cover the question constructively. In this respect and in concurrence with the Commanding General's desires, every effort was made by this Headquarters to assist the Inspector by suggestions and cooperation.

2. The recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of basic communication are concurred in.

*Re para. a and b:* Priority action is requested on the assignment of two administrative officers to the Depot for assignment as Intelligence Plans Officer and Depot Inspector, as recommended in paragraph 6 b, basic report. These administrative and supervisory duties are being handled at the present time by Depot officers in addition to a large number of other executive type of duties.

*Re para c:* The Depot First Aid Station has been expanded with the employment of an additional Nurse in order to allow the former Nurse to act as a Traveling Nurse and thus keep in more intimate and helpful contact with employees and their families.

*Re para. d:* The lumber stacked at the end of the main run-way #4 has been removed by the District Engineer, which action has removed one of the more serious flying and sabotage hazards.

*Re para. e:* Due to the lack of available civilian guards and consequent difficulty in employing additional civilian guards of trustworthy character, the Depot has called upon Hickam Field for enlisted guards. It is believed that the Guard Roster may have to be materially increased, even beyond 42 men.

*Re para. f:* Full compliance with this recommendation will, of necessity, be progressive and will be completed when the Depot is moved into its new buildings. In the meantime, this Headquarters has initiated action on making badges and distinctive colors, which are in the process of procurement and issue.

*Re para. g:* Prepared plans include the screen fences mentioned in the Inspector's recommendation.

*Re para. h:* Detailed guard duties governing the parking plan have been prescribed in writing to insure that no unauthorized material is brought into or removed from the shops, also to insure that all personnel, other than the authorized guards, are required to leave the shops and parking area promptly after working hours. This special problem will be simplified upon completion of the proposed fence. Then all personnel en route to and from the parking lot, which will be located outside the fence, will be checked in and out of the new gate, recommended hereinafter in paragraph 3 b.

*Re para. i:* Survey has been initiated.

*Re para. j:* Pistols have been issued to Section offices for use in case of internal riot or disorder.

*Re para. k:* Action has been initiated.

*Re para. l:* Action has been initiated.

*Re para. m:* Due to the quick and definite difference between the previous peacetime status and the present unlimited emergency status, this Headquarters is of the further opinion that the Depot area is still subject to successful acts of planned and directed sabotage during the present period of construction of buildings and grounds, and for this reason early action on the assignment of additional administrative officers and the priority requested for protective fence and lights is recommended.

3. *Conclusions:* a. The conclusions of the Special Inspector were coordinated and concurred in by this Headquarters previous to the submission of his report. Subsequent to the submission of the above inspection report and in attendance with the Special Inspector, a further survey of the joint Hawaiian Air Depot-Hickam Field situation has been made of water valves, electrical terminals and man-holes with the result that action has been initiated to provide additional safeguards in this respect.

b. The Special Inspector concurs in the urgent need for an additional gate for the separate entrance and exit of Depot personnel.

c. Reference to the conclusions of the Inspector in regard to heavy type bombardment aircraft, special attention has been given to the determination of critical items such as, exposed cables, counter-balances in the tail assembly, connection of the cables with the servo drums and for the protection against hidden small electric or chemical bombs or explosives, and to insure a check on the custodian of keys and locks in the fuselage doors.

d. Reference the conclusions of the Inspector in respect to checking personnel traits and records, additional steps have been initiated by this Headquarters to effect a close contact with the Department Provost Marshal with special reference to the checking of Police, Civil Service, and Immigration records on all newly-employed common laborers.

e. Reference the selection of other critical items, special attention to any leakage of gas and oil in the warehouse and storerooms and the pollution of lubricating machine oil in the shops was suggested by shops superintendents to the inspector and additional safeguards provided with the concurrence of the inspector.

f. Reference the conclusions in regard to increased restaurant and social facilities, action has been initiated with special reference to the restaurant, athletic association, pistol club, bowling league, and credit union.

Leland C. Hurd  
LELAND C. HURD,  
Lt. Col., Air Corps,  
Commanding.



1st Ind.

AG 383.4 (7-15-41)

24

Hq. SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, T. H.,  
July 17, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

General Murray took this subject up personally with General Short, making a verbal reply.

For the Commanding General:

EDWARD JENKINS,  
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry,  
Acting Adjutant General.

CONFIDENTIAL

Commanding General Hawaiian Department.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington, March 26, 1941.

AG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M

Subject: Provisions for security of installations.

To: The Commanding Generals, All Armies, GHQ Air Force, Departments, Corps Areas, and Air Forces;  
Chief of the Air Corps;  
Chief of Ordnance; and  
The Quartermaster General.

1. The possibility of widespread simultaneous, as well as isolated and spasmodic, attempts at sabotage of military supplies and equipment is increasing daily. The multiplication of new stations, and the growing number of airplanes and pieces of motor equipment, make the difficulty of guarding against such dangers more acute.

2. The most vigorous efforts will be made by all commanders to provide adequate security for installations and equipment for which they are responsible.

3. Security will be greatly enhanced where vital areas can be fenced and lighted, but in the absence of such construction adequate interior guards must be maintained. The effective functioning of countersubversive measures pursuant to instructions from Department or Corps Area Commanders will materially aid in the accomplishment of security.

4. Necessary countersubversive measures are a responsibility of command and are organized and directed under the authority of the unit commanders. Department and Corp Areas Commanders are responsible for the coordination of security measures throughout their Departments and Corps Areas, including activities at exempted stations. They should be freely consulted in such matters.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. S. ADAMS,  
Major General  
The Adjutant General.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 15 July 1941.

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Lieutenant Colonel Roland Walsh, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort Armstrong, T. H.,

With reference to letter this headquarters subject as above, dated 1 May 1941, request information as to when a reply may be expected.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

O. M. McDole,  
O. M. McDole,  
Major, A. G. D., Assistant Adjutant General.

1st Ind.

AG 383.4/6

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN QUARTERMASTER DEPOT,  
*Fort Armstrong, T. H., 16 July 1941.*

To: Major O. M. McDole, Asst. Adjutant General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H.

Information pertaining to the above subject may be expected on 25 July 1941.  
For the Commanding Officer:B. F. Modisett,  
B. F. MODISETT,  
*Major, Infantry, Executive Officer.*

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CONFIDENTIALHEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 1 May 1941.*

In reply refer to: AG 383.4/6

Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

To: Brigadier General Maxwell Murray, U. S. A., Schofield Barracks, T. H.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of War Department letter 26 March 1941 on the above subject.

2. The Commanding General desires that you personally inspect the warehouse area at Schofield Barracks to see if warehouses are adequately guarded.

3. The Commanding General further desires that you make a report to him as to the result of your inspection.

CARL GROSSE,  
*Major, A. G. D., Assistant Adjutant General.*

By Courier 1 May 1941 CG

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CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

## INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff and will not be sent to subordinate commanders.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded thru the Adjutant General, except that a General Staff section may route papers to another General Staff section direct. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

AG 383.4/6



No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Ltr WD TAG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M, 26 March 1941, "Provisions for security of installations."	971
1st Ind. AG 26 April 41	G-2	Two (2) copies received, one copy retained in AG files. 1 Incl.	C. G.
W-76			
2d Ind. G-2 22 APR 41	C/S	1. For your information. 2. I propose to send ditto copies of this communication to all G-2 and S-2 officers, Hawaiian Department, for information and necessary action, and to check with Commanding Officers of Posts especially with regard to paragraph 4, and report to this office.	
		Incl. No change.	M. W. M.
3d Ind C/S 4/29/41	AG	The Department Commander desires that copies of this letter be furnished to General Martin, General Murray, Lt. Colonel Walsh, Q. M. C., General Gardner, and Colonel Capron, O. D.; a wrapper letter to General Martin, directing him to personally inspect to see if airplanes, supplies, and Maintenance Buildings are adequately guarded; a wrapper letter to General Murray, directing him to personally inspect the warehouse area at Schofield Barracks to see if warehouses are adequately guarded; a wrapper letter to Lt. Colonel Walsh directing him to personally inspect the warehouse area of the Quartermaster Depot to see if the warehouses and supplies are adequately guarded; a wrapper letter to General Gardner directing him to personally inspect his installations to see if they are adequately guarded; a wrapper letter to Colonel Capron, directing him to make a personal inspection to see if the ammunition and Ordnance Depot is adequately guarded—all to make a report to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department as to the results of their inspections. Incl: N/C	
4th Ind AG 1 May 41	G-2	For notation of action taken and return.	
W-80			
5th Ind. G-2 2 May 41	A.G.	Noted. Incl: N/C.	M. W. M.

CONFIDENTIAL

ACW/amh

AG 383.4 (3-15-41) M-B

MARCH 19, 1941.

Subject: Investigation of Subversive Activities in the Civilian Conservation Corps.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Attention is invited to the inclosed copy of an agreement between the War Department and the Director of the Civilian Conservation Corps relative to the responsibility for investigations dealing with espionage, counter-espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities within the CCC.

2. The Counter-Subversive system, including the selection and designation of informants within the ranks of the CCC, is being made the subject of further study and will not be placed into effect at this time.

3. Correspondence and reports relative to CCC investigations will be accomplished and distributed in the same manner as currently prescribed for military activities.

By order of the Secretary of War:

\_\_\_\_\_, *Adjutant General.*

1 Incl.

Cy., CCC agreement,  
2-26-41.

## CONFIDENTIAL

1st Ind. AG 3 April 41 G-2

AG 383.4/5

Ltr. WD AGO 383.4 (3-15-41) M-B, 19 March 1941, "Investigation of Subversive Activities in the Civilian Conservation Corps."

Basic communication received in duplicate, inclosure in single copy, one copy of basic retained in AG files.

C. G.

1 Incl.

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*Re para m:*

Due to the quick and definite difference between the previous peacetime status and the present unlimited emergency status, this Headquarters is of the further opinion that the Depot area is still subject to successful acts of planned and directed sabotage during the present period of construction of buildings and grounds, and for this reason early action on the assignment of additional administrative officers and the priority requested for protective fence and lights is recommended.

3. *Conclusions:*

a. The conclusions of the Special Inspector were coordinated and concurred in by this Headquarters previous to the submission of his report. Subsequent to the submission of the above inspection report and in attendance with the Special Inspector, a further survey of the joint Hawaiian Air Depot-Hickam Field situation has been made of water valves, electrical terminals and man-holes with the result that action has been initiated to provide additional safeguards in this respect.

b. The Special Inspector concurs in the urgent need for an additional gate for the separate entrance and exit of Depot personnel.

c. Reference to the conclusions of the Inspector in regard to heavy type bombardment aircraft, special attention has been given to the determination of critical items such as, exposed cables, counter-balances in the tail assembly, connection of the cables with the servo drums and for the protection against hidden small electric or chemical bombs or explosives, and to insure a check on the custodian of keys and locks in the fuselage doors.

d. Reference the conclusions of the Inspector in respect to checking personnel traits and records, additional steps have been initiated by this Headquarters to effect a close contact with the Department Provost Marshal with special reference to the checking of Police, Civil Service, and Immigration records on all newly-employed common laborers.

2nd Ind. to CG HAF 6/13/41

e. Reference the selection of other critical items, special attention to any leakage of gas and oil in the warehouse and storerooms and the pollution of lubricating machine oil in the shops was suggested by shops superintendents to the inspector and additional safeguards provided with the concurrence of the inspector.

f. Reference the conclusions in regard to increased restaurant and social facilities, action has been initiated with special reference to the restaurant, athletic association, pistol club, bowling league, and credit union.

Leland C. Hurd  
LELAND C. HURD,  
Lt. Col., Air Corps,  
Commanding